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Executive summary
Building resilience to climate extremes and disasters 
will help ensure the success of global efforts to 
eliminate extreme poverty. Reaching and sustaining 
zero extreme poverty, the first of the SDGs, requires 
a collective effort to manage the risks of current 
climate extremes and projected climate change.
1. Linking efforts to combat climate change 
and poverty
The global climate is warming and there is now grow-
ing evidence that climate variability is increasing in 
many places and extremes are becoming more fre-
quent and intense in some parts of the world. Greater 
seasonal variability and changes in the prevalence and 
intensity of climate extremes pose serious challenges 
for poverty reduction in the future, both in terms of 
impact and the increased uncertainty that intensified 
climate risk brings. 
Three major international frameworks will guide 
post-2015 action on climate change, disasters and 
development: the 21st Session of the Conference of 
the Parties (COP21) in Paris, the Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Together with the 2016 
World Humanitarian Summit, these provide an oppor-
tunity to join up efforts and address development and 
climate change challenges. For all of these frameworks 
to deliver, countries need to ensure their development 
trajectories don’t maintain or exacerbate climate risks. 
2. Examining climate extremes and resilient 
poverty reduction
This report explores the relationships between climate 
change and poverty, focusing on climate extremes, on 
the basis that these manifestations of climate change 
will most affect our attempts to reduce poverty over 
the next 15 to 25 years. Framed by a wider analysis, 
three detailed studies – on drought risk in Mali, 
heatwaves in India and typhoons in the Philippines 
– illustrate the relationship between climate change, 
climate extremes, disasters and poverty impacts. 
All three case studies show the disproportionate 
impact of climate extremes on those living below the 
poverty line and those who suffer from non-income 
dimensions of poverty. Immediate impacts on poor 
households include loss of life (and associated loss 
of household earnings), illness, and loss of crops and 
other assets. Longer-term effects include increases in 
the price of staple foods, a reduction in food security, 
malnourishment, malnutrition and stunting in children, 
as well as lower educational attainment. 
Indirect impacts are felt not only by poor house-
holds living in affected areas, but also by those in other 
parts of the country through drops in productivity and 
economic growth, loss of government assets, service 
disruption and the diversion of government spending 
to response activities. This supports the finding that 
there is no simple geographical co-location of climate 
extremes and poverty impacts: while there are some 
‘hotspots’ around which to target interventions, 
such as in urban areas vulnerable to floods or storms, 
there are also significant knock-on effects on poor 
people elsewhere. 
3. Implications for policy and planning
This report calls for improved resilience to climate 
extremes as a requisite for achieving poverty 
reduction targets. To achieve this, planners and policy 
makers will need to support the strengthening of the 
absorptive, anticipatory and adaptive capacities of 
communities and societies. New ways of working are 
required to link institutions that have previously been 
poorly connected, with new criteria for decision-mak-
ing, such as considering the best solutions across 
different possible climate futures. The scale of the 
challenge suggests more transformative actions may 
be necessary, including through the use of new risk 
financing mechanisms. 
Build adaptive, anticipatory and absorptive capacity
Tackling the combined challenges of poverty 
eradication and climate change requires action to 
increase the resilience of communities and societies 
most vulnerable to increasing climate risks. Capacity 
at the local level shapes how impacts of extremes 
play out and affect patterns of poverty. By building 
the anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive capacities of 
those communities and societies most vulnerable to 
increasing climate risks, we can minimise the impact of 
climate extremes on poverty levels and the poor.
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Strengthen institutions, across scales
Continued investment in local disaster risk man-
agement capacities and institutions is required, as 
well as efforts to strengthen coordination across 
different levels of governance. Decentralisation can 
help empower local institutions and, when coupled 
with efforts to integrate local units within national 
and regional planning systems, it can produce more 
effective local solutions to the risks posed by climate 
extremes.
Think globally, but assess risk locally
While regional and global assessments are essential 
for understanding the scope of the climate challenge, 
local diagnosis is needed to provide a more accurate 
understanding of how risk is distributed. Analysis 
that connects macro-to-micro-scales, drawing on the 
comparative strengths offered at each level of analysis, 
will present a more nuanced and accurate picture of 
the climate change-disaster-poverty nexus.  
Link institutions and solutions
Solutions that strengthen resilience and reduce 
poverty will need to link different institutions that 
have previously been poorly connected. Analysis of 
the relationship between climate change, disaster and 
poverty reveals some important gaps in connectivity 
and coordination across fields of policy and practice. 
More joined up ways of working across sectors and 
scales may be required, using climate and weather 
information, along with scenarios to inform planning.
The role of transformative action
Building resilience capacities incrementally may not 
be enough to secure poverty reduction in the face of 
climate change. The scale and scope of future climate 
risks will require a transformational shift in the way risk 
is managed. Transformational changes can be catalytic 
in nature, leveraging change beyond the initial direct 
activities. They achieve change at scale, with outcomes 
of a high order of magnitude relative to resource 
inputs, or can be sustainable over time, outlasting 
initial political and/or financial support.
Finance as a catalyst for transformation
Risk financing instruments have the potential to gen-
erate transformational changes by acting as a catalyst 
for further investment in disaster risk management and 
adaptation. Regional financing mechanisms can also 
help countries to scale up these investments in places 
where they are most needed. Finance is not a panacea 
and has limitations in some developing contexts, but 
it can and does offer opportunities for new ways to 
manage risk that warrant further attention as part of 
a portfolio of solutions.
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Preface
There is a tendency to assume a strong overlap exists 
between places with high relative and absolute numbers 
of those in poverty and those that are most affected by 
climate extremes. The 2013 report The geography of 
poverty, disasters and climate extremes in 2030 mapped 
out where the poorest people are likely to live and found 
that many places with high numbers of poor will also 
experience increasing extreme weather events. The report 
concluded that up to 325 million extremely poor people 
will be living in the 49 most hazard-prone countries in 
2030, the majority in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. 
It also estimated high levels of potential disaster-induced 
poverty by 2030 in countries such as Bangladesh, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Sudan, 
Sudan and Uganda. Yet, the picture at the sub-national 
level, where the impact of disasters is felt most acutely, 
is less clear. Within a country, levels of hazard intensity 
and frequency vary dramatically, as do people’s exposure 
and vulnerability to different hazards. Hence the poverty 
impacts also vary geographically. 
In 2015, we decided to explore these relationships in 
more detail, this time focusing only on climate extremes 
in the belief that these manifestations of climate change 
would most affect our attempts to reduce poverty over 
the next 15 to 25 years. Climate models are limited in 
their ability to produce projections of drought, floods and 
tropical storms, and even what is meant by an extreme 
will vary between contexts. Yet there is now increasing 
evidence that climate variability is increasing in many 
places, with extremes becoming more frequent and 
intense in some parts of the world. The impact these 
events have had on poverty levels and poor people varies 
from place to place but there are some common determi-
nants and lessons for building resilience that apply across 
a range of extremes and contexts. This report explores this 
climate change- 
disaster-poverty nexus through three detailed studies 
where a clear relationship between climate change, 
climate extremes, disasters and poverty impacts can be 
traced.
Chapter 1 presents the challenge of eliminating 
extreme poverty by 2030 and highlights some of the key 
mechanisms through which climate extremes lead to 
disasters, as well as evidence on the links between climate 
change and development and poverty. Chapter 2 focuses 
on three types of events where there is clearest evidence 
of changes in terms of the magnitude, frequency and 
variability of climate phenomena: climate variability and 
extremes in the Sahel, storm surges in the Philippines 
and heatwaves in India. We demonstrate how what was 
once considered extreme has, in some parts of the world, 
become increasingly common. In chapters 3–5, we exam-
ine patterns of extreme events, exposure and vulnerability 
in each of the case studies from those three regions and 
analyse some of the poverty impacts of recent events. 
We review existing policies to manage climate change 
risks and assess the adequacy of these, given projections 
of climate extremes. Through the case studies, we see 
that disasters clearly have a disproportional impact on 
the poor because of their exposure and vulnerability to 
different types of climate extremes. However, the story is 
more complex at the local level and impacts are not just 
felt in the places where these extremes occur. The report 
suggests that the idea of poverty and climate extreme 
hotspots may be erroneous and more attention needs 
to be paid to understanding how different groups are 
vulnerable in order to build resilience capacities.
Chapter 6 discusses principles, planning and policy 
tools for building resilience in the face of uncertainty. The 
chapter discusses how solutions will need to link different 
institutions, prioritise new criteria in decision-making and 
be flexible in light of different possible climate futures. 
Chapter 7 outlines tools and lessons that planners and 
policy makers need to incorporate in order to accommo-
date climate extremes in order to achieve resilient poverty 
reduction. It does so through a set of principles for 
building resilience. Building on case study findings, it con-
cludes that tackling the combined challenges of poverty 
eradication and climate risk will require joint action aimed 
at promoting development, reducing vulnerability to 
climate extremes and managing exposure to those risks. 
This report calls for resilient poverty reduction. To 
achieve this, the absorptive, anticipatory and adaptive 
capacities of communities and societies will need to be 
strengthened. New ways of working to link institutions 
that have previously been poorly connected are required, 
with new criteria for decision-making, such as considering 
the best solutions across different possible climate 
futures, a priority. 
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CHAPTER 1  
The geography of poverty 
and climate extremes
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1.1 Climate change and poverty: an introduction
The complete elimination of extreme poverty by 
2030 is one of the internationally agreed Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Progress in human devel-
opment has been remarkable in the last two decades, 
with global levels of extreme poverty coming down 
from 43% to 14% (UN, 2015b). However, under the new 
World Bank definition of extreme poverty, which lifts 
the poverty line to $1.90 per day (based on the US dollar 
exchange rate of 2011 instead of the previous 2005 rate), 
it is estimated that 10% of the world’s population live 
under this threshold (World Bank, 2015d). This progress 
has not been evenly distributed among or within coun-
tries. Around the world, 850 million people still live on 
less than $1.25 per day, and the number of people living 
below this poverty line in sub-Saharan Africa increased 
by 209 million between 1981 and 2010 (World Bank 
and PREM, 2013). Some 1.3 billion people lack access to 
electricity, 900 million to clean water and 2.6 billion to 
improved sanitation; around 800 million rural dwellers 
are cut off from the world in the rainy season without 
access to an all-weather road (Fay et al., 2010; IEA, 2011). 
Climate change presents both threats and 
opportunities for future development ambitions. 
Small dikes used for water management can be used 
to divert flooding away from settlements and assets, 
while extremes of precipitation can be harnessed and 
diverted away for irrigation, and water storage can be 
used as a buffer against drought. These projects offer 
opportunities for turning climate variability and even 
extreme events into benefits. They could be expanded 
and scaled-up, but tend to be underdeveloped in 
poor areas. While projections of climate change are 
often focused on the longer term, when issues such 
as sea-level rise may threaten the viability of low-lying 
islands and coastal areas, climate change could also 
have significant impacts on efforts to reduce poverty in 
the medium term. Increases in average global tempera-
tures are already generating greater seasonal variability 
and affecting the timing, frequency and intensity 
of climate extremes in some areas; these trends are 
projected to accelerate (IPCC, 2012). 
Limiting the scale and extent of impacts is vital. 
Developing low-carbon approaches to development 
across the world that could limit global temperature 
rise to less than 2°C is a pivotal goal. Outcomes of the 
21st session of the Conference of Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in 
2015 are central in guiding the efforts of governments, 
the private sector and civil society to avoid crossing 
this threshold of ‘dangerous’ climate change. If the 
2°C increase is exceeded, adaptation could become 
an increasingly costly and potentially implausible 
mechanism for averting the impact of climate change 
on poverty eradication. Even on a pathway to a 2°C 
increase, adaptation is expected to cost $35 billion by 
Summary
This chapter presents the challenge of reducing 
extreme poverty under climate change. It argues that 
climate extremes are the manifestations of climate 
change most likely to affect poverty over the next 
25 years, with impacts on lives, livelihoods and assets 
impeding efforts to eradicate it. 
• While global poverty levels have lessened over 
the past two decades, progress is uneven both 
between and within countries.
• Greater seasonal variability and changes in the 
prevalence and intensity of climate extremes 
pose serious challenges for poverty reduction 
in the future. 
• Countries with high levels of poverty are also among 
the most affected by disasters. This is because the 
determinants of disaster risk are similar to those of 
poverty, but also because disasters affect the poor 
disproportionately and in multiple ways.
• At the local level, the picture is more complex and 
modelling future impacts is particularly challenging, 
given the uncertainties inherent in projections of 
extreme events and of poverty.
• Mapping these extremes against poverty indicators 
is problematic because an ‘extreme’ event can 
only be understood relative to local experiences of 
weather. Greater attention needs to be paid to local 
sensitivities to extremes.
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2050 in Africa alone. Globally, catastrophic impacts such 
as major sea-level rise could begin to result in much 
larger costs of up to $350 billion a year (Schaeffer et al., 
2013). 
Whatever the scale of success is in limiting future 
climate change, some change is already projected as the 
climate responds to historic emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs). The task of reaching and sustaining zero 
extreme poverty in the next 15 to 25 years  will be 
shaped to a large degree by our collective efforts to build 
resilience to increases in global average temperatures, 
ocean impacts, climate variability and climate extremes 
(IPCC, 2014b). Maintaining poverty gains beyond 
2030 will also require limiting the increase in mean 
global temperature to 2°C, necessitating major reduc-
tions in GHG emissions toward zero net GHG emissions 
by the end of the century (Granoff et al., 2015). Achieving 
this, along with broader decisions about development 
pathways at local, national and international levels, 
will determine the direction of change of climate risk 
globally (IPCC, 2014b).
1.2 The climate change-disaster-poverty nexus
1.2.1 Clarifying the link between poverty, climate change 
and disasters
The income poor are those whose expenditure (or 
income) falls below a poverty line. Calculating numbers 
below that line is useful for describing the poverty 
profile of a country but it is also important to under-
stand why some people are poor, in order to be able 
to address the root causes of poverty. Among the key 
causes are (Haughton and Khandker, 2009):
• Region-level characteristics, which include 
vulnerability to flooding or typhoons, remoteness, 
quality of governance, and property rights and their 
enforcement
• Community-level characteristics, which include the 
availability of infrastructure (roads, water, electricity) 
and services (health, education), proximity to 
markets and social relationships
• Household and individual characteristics, among 
the most important of which are
 – Demographic, such as household size, age struc-
ture, dependency ratio and gender of head
 – Economic, such as employment status, hours 
worked and property owned
 – Social, such as health and nutritional status, edu-
cation and shelter.
According to the classification presented above, 
vulnerability to climate extremes is a regional deter-
minant of poverty. Yet climate extremes can also alter 
community, household and individual determinants 
of poverty by, for example, damaging infrastructure, 
disrupting services and affecting employment, health, 
education and housing. The IPCC Fifth Assessment 
Report predicts (with ‘medium confidence’) that climate 
change will slow down economic growth, make poverty 
reduction more difficult and further erode food security, 
along with also prolonging existing poverty traps and 
creating new ones, particularly in urban areas and 
emerging hotspots of hunger (IPCC, 2014a). The IPCCC 
does not, however, provide a full analysis of the ways 
in which climate change will affect poverty levels, and 
we do not attempt to cover that ground in this report 
either. Rather, we present some of the key mechanisms 
through which climate extremes lead to disasters and 
the types of impacts that disasters have on income 
poverty. 
Climate extremes are not synonymous with disaster. 
Disaster risk is a function of hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability, with the impact of all hazards on people, 
livelihoods and assets greater when levels of exposure 
and vulnerability are high. Disaster risk is the probabil-
ity of the occurrence of a disaster event, derived from 
the interaction of physical hazards and the vulnerabil-
ities of exposed elements. (Cardona et al., 2012). The 
UNISDR defines vulnerability as ‘the characteristics 
and circumstances of a community, system or asset 
that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a 
hazard’ and exposure as the ‘people, property, systems, 
or other elements present in hazard zones that are 
thereby subject to potential losses’ (UNISDR, 2009). 
Although it is difficult to disentangle the relative 
importance of each of these contributing factors, we 
know that disaster losses have been rising rapidly 
and that more disasters are linked to extreme climate 
events (as opposed to geophysical hazards) now than 
in the past. Global economic losses from ‘natural’ 
disasters today are between $250 and $300 billion each 
year (UNISDR, 2015), up from $50 billion in the 1980s 
(UNISDR, 2015), of which a high proportion is due to 
extreme climate events (Aon Benfield, 2014). Levels of 
exposure to these extreme events are also rising, driven 
by global development trends such as: 
• population growth 
• urbanisation (where new arrivals are forced to live in 
marginal, hazard-prone places)
• people increasingly living in coastal areas and 
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floodplains 
• the degradation or loss of natural ecosystems 
(which serve as barriers to flooding)
(IPCC, 2012; UNISDR, 2015). 
At the national or regional level, the determinants of 
disaster risk are similar to the determinants of poverty 
outlined above. The quality of governance systems, 
for example, explains to some extent why, since 1990, 
almost 90% of mortality in internationally recorded dis-
asters has occurred in low and middle-income countries 
(UNISDR, 2015, p44–45). Faced with the same numbers 
of people exposed and hazards of the same severity, 
lower-income countries with weaker governance 
systems will have significantly higher mortality rates. For 
a similar level of exposure – to a Category 3 cyclone, for 
example – around 50% of the variance in mortality risk is 
explained by vulnerability (UNISDR, 2015). 
At the community, household and individual levels, 
the relationship between disaster risk and poverty is 
more complex. On the one hand, the determinants 
of poverty and exposure and vulnerability to climate 
extremes appear to be quite similar. The poorest 
people often live on marginal urban land at risk from 
floods and landslides, and in drought-prone rural 
areas, meaning they are commonly the most exposed 
to climate extremes. The poorest also tend to be more 
vulnerable to these extremes, lacking access to the 
information and support services needed to prepare 
for and respond to disasters, or the ability to protect 
their assets or take out insurance to spread risk. Yet the 
relationship between poverty and disasters is compli-
cated by the effect that disasters themselves have on 
the poor. The effects that the death of family members 
has on the rest of the household are significant and 
include loss of earnings. However, disasters also affect 
the incomes, assets and savings of survivors, which can 
lead to long-term setbacks in health, education and 
employment opportunities through disadvantages 
such as malnourishment and missed schooling. 
Evidence from a number of studies at different scales 
suggests disasters can cause impoverishment and 
contribute to poverty traps, as poor people are forced 
to sell or consume the few assets they have, deepening 
their poverty and undermining their human capital 
(see table 1) (Shepherd et al., 2013). This, in turn, 
undermines people’s capacity to anticipate and absorb 
the impacts of subsequent extreme events or adapt to 
deal with future shocks (Bahadur et al., 2015), creating 
a cycle of vulnerability.
1.3 Evidence on the nexus
1.3.1 Nature of the evidence
Empirical studies on the climate change-disasters-pov-
erty nexus look at climate change and its manifes-
tations, along with the development and poverty 
outcomes at different levels:
Table 1. Examples of disaster impacts that pose challenges to poverty reduction*
Direct impacts on the poor Indirect impacts on the poor (via development impacts)
Shorter-term 
impacts
• Loss of earnings 
• Loss of assets: housing, savings, crops, land 
and possessions
• Forced consumption of limited assets and savings
• Reduced access to food, water and health care
• Halt in schooling and healthcare programmes  
(e.g. vaccinations)
• Loss of economically active persons (through death,  
injury and sickness) 
• Loss of labour force and lower productive output  
(e.g. crops, industry)
• Loss of assets: government buildings e.g. healthcare facilities, 
schools; infrastructure e.g. water, electricity and road networks
• Diversion of government and private spending to response
• Short term supply chain disruption
Longer-term 
impacts
• Loss of productive agricultural land
• Increase in the price of staple foods
• Reduction in food security, leading to malnourishment 
and stunting
• Lowered educational attainment and life expectancy
• Undermined future resilience and capacity to cope 
with shocks
• Secondary and longer-term impacts
• Increased spending on imports to meet food demands
• Allocation of budgets to reconstruction and recovery
• Increased debt responding to recovery needs
• Long-term supply chain disruption
• Relocation of productive sectors (regionally or internationally)
• Reduced income and consumption levels
• Reduction in exports and export income and increase in imports
• Slower economic growth due to long term consequences of 
reduced investment in physical and human capital
*This is not an exhaustive list. The impacts are not necessarily independent of each other and can lead to cascading effects or be prevented or 
circumvented altogether.
Climate extremes and resilient poverty reduction 11
• macro (national Gross domestic Product (GDP) and 
between countries) 
• meso (subnational administrative units and cross 
border regions such as river catchments) 
• micro (household and community).
Most studies indicate the direction of the rela-
tionships between these phenomena, but often stop 
short of predicting or measuring the impact of climate 
change on poverty. They tend to offer evidence at the 
macro and micro levels, but research at the level of 
decentralised governance units, river basins and other 
sub-national administrative or spatial scales is less 
common: meso-level data is collected less frequently 
and tends not to be aggregated. Nonetheless, it is 
precisely at the water catchment and administrative 
scales – from transboundary rivers/lakes/aquifer sys-
tems to micro-basins – that resilient poverty reduction 
efforts are arguably most needed (McCarthy, 2001). At 
the macro level, research has tended to focus on GDP 
growth, which is only part of the story. The multiple 
dimensions of poverty have been explored more at the 
micro than macro scale and few studies adopt a holistic 
approach in which climatic and non-climatic drivers are 
analysed simultaneously.
Overall, studies on the nexus can broadly be divided 
into two categories: 
• Those examining how climate extremes and 
disasters have had an impact on poverty and 
economic growth in the past, usually focusing on 
one particular event. 
• Those using models incorporating climate change 
projections to create plausible scenarios for how 
climate change will have an impact on poverty and 
growth in the future. 
For the second category, the precise impact climate 
change will have on poverty has been particularly 
difficult to estimate. Climate change projections have 
their own uncertainties, as do poverty projections (with 
their many dimensions). Also, not all models agree and, 
as a result, there are too many uncertainties for reliable 
results to be produced. Studies give an indication of 
the direction of some of the effects, but stop short 
of predicting or quantifying impacts. Statistical 
relationships have been derived from studies linking 
climate change projections to development indicators, 
such as a decline in economic productivity or a rise 
in the poverty headcount. However, these need to 
be interpreted with caution, with due attention to 
both context and high levels of statistical uncertainty. 
Average annual rainfall or temperature rises can mask 
the importance of extremes and the significance of 
specific months or seasons in a particular region and 
not all changes in climate will be spatially or temporally 
uniform. Regional and local contexts are important. For 
example, a 1°C change in temperatures in one region 
will not have the same effects on livelihoods as the 
same change in another place; similarly, the precise 
conditions under which crops are grown differ by 
region, as do productivity and prices.
1.3.2 Key findings
Most evidence supports the conclusion that disasters 
lead to negative economic outcomes, particularly in 
developing countries (Hochrainer, 2009; Noy, 2009). 
The severity of the disaster plays an important role in 
determining its economic impact, although developing 
countries are more sensitive to disasters, regardless of 
severity. Overall economic losses may be higher in rich 
countries but even small losses in income at macro and 
micro levels in low-income countries can have a severe 
effect on economic growth and the wellbeing of the 
poorest people respectively. Skidmore and Toya (2002) 
find a positive correlation between GDP growth and 
frequency of disaster events, when including expend-
iture on recovery and reconstruction. This suggests 
disasters may have a ‘creative destruction’ effect, in 
which post-disaster investments in infrastructure and 
human capital reinvigorate productivity (Skoufias et 
al., 2011). Overall, the literature on this topic focuses 
mostly on economic growth impacts, rather than 
distributional impacts on poor people. However, we 
know that the impact of disasters is stacked against the 
poorest, children and other vulnerable groups (Twigg, 
2015). At all scales, the socio-economic impacts will be 
different depending on the level of poverty; the impact 
on poor people appears to be greater than for the rest 
of the population.
Models of climate change scenarios provide some 
evidence of poverty impacts at the sub-national level, 
demonstrating that a climate-related decline in agri-
cultural yields will have very different impacts across 
different geographies and groups in society. Studies 
find that climate change will bring different results in 
different countries: higher inequality in some, increases 
in poverty in others and even a decrease in poverty 
and inequality in others still (Anderson and Verner, 
2010). Factors such as household income, the price of 
staple foods and cost of living at the poverty line are 
all expected to have more important consequences 
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Poverty dimensions
 Education
 Health and malnutrition or mortality
 Economic income and growth
 Inequalities
 Agricultural output or productivity
 Household consumption 
 Human Development Index composite
*These studies apply to more than one dimension of poverty.
Table 2. Climate phenomena and development: A complex relationship across scales
Climate extremes, disasters and development
Authors (date) Poverty variables Timescale Disasters variable Key findings
MACRO LEVEL
Noy (2009) GDP growth Medium 
term
Natural disasters (all) Ability to mobilise resources for the reconstruction and 




GDP growth, total factor 
productivity
Long term Storms, droughts, 
earthquakes, floods
Positive correlation between frequency of natural disasters 
and long-term economic growth.
Loayza et al. 
(2012)




Disasters affect economic growth, but not always 
negatively. Moderate disasters can have a positive growth 
effect, but severe disasters do not. Economic growth in 
developing countries is more sensitive to disasters.
Raddatz (2009) GDP growth, output 
volatility
Short term Rainfall shocks, 
storms, earthquakes. 
Climate disasters have a negative economic effect, with 1% 











Natural disasters on average lead to negative effects 















Occurrence of natural disasters reduced the Human 
Development Index by about 1% per municipality, with 
droughts and floods causing the most severe impact.
MICRO LEVEL
Dercon et al. 
(2005)
Consumption Short term, 
long term
Drought Rainfall shocks have substantial impacts on consumption 
growth, which persists for years.
Skoufias and 
Vinha (2012)
Child height Short term Rainfall shocks Extreme temperatures and flooding can negatively impact 
agricultural productivity, increasing possibilities of malnutrition 
in young children. The study finds that Mexican children 
are shorter on average after a year of high precipitation and 
are similarly shorter two years after extreme temperature 
lows. These impacts could be from reduction in household 
consumption or from increasing prevalence of diseases 
associated with weather shocks.
Hoddinott and 
Kinsey (2002)
Child height Short term Drought Children aged 12–24 months lose up to 2cm of growth 
after a drought. There is no evidence that older children 
experience a slowdown in their growth. 







Drought, hurricane After Hurricane Mitch, wealthy households were able to 
at least partially rebuild lost assets. The lowest wealth group 
felt effects of shock more acutely and for longer. After a 
drought in Ethiopia, the lowest wealth groups refrained from 
selling assets important to their livelihoods during periods 
of severe agricultural productive loss. This led to a drop in 
household consumption.
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Climate change and development




Output per capita Future Temperature 
change scenarios
Climate change scenario with warming but no precipitation 










There is a 32% cereal price increase in pessimistic 
scenario and 16% increase in optimistic scenario. Yield 
changes are poor predictors of change in national poverty 
levels because changes in earnings are more important 
drivers of household poverty than commodity prices. 
Cline (2008) Agricultural output Future Business-as-usual 
warming scenario
Climate change will have modest negative impacts on 
agricultural yield in the global aggregate, with losses 




Consumption Past Climate variability 
(rainfall or 
temperature)
A household’s ability to protect its consumption from 
weather shocks depends on the nature of the shock, when 
in the agricultural year the shock occurs and the climatic 
region. Ability to smooth consumption depends on proximity 
and access to transportation.
Anderson 
(2006)
Output, GDP, income Future Climate scenarios 
of 3.9°C mean 
increase
By 2100, based on a scenario of 3.9°C warming, climate 
change may cause an additional 12 million people to be 






Agricultural output Future Temperature and 
rainfall scenarios
Based on IPCC projections, climate change will increase the 
poverty rate in rural areas of Brazil by 3.2% by 2050.
Jacoby et al., 
(2011)
Agricultural output, 





divided by political 
districts
National poverty rate in India will rise by 2–4% compared 
to zero warming scenario. Fall in agricultural productivity 
(17% overall) will translate into modest consumption 
decline, as households derive the bulk of their income from 
wage employment. Rural wages are estimated to fall by 





Future 2°C increase in 
temperature
Municipal data shows that climate change will have 
heterogeneous effects, with a decrease in poverty in Bolivia 
and increases in poverty in Brazil, Chile and Peru. Inequality 
is expected to remain neutral for Peru, Mexico, and Chile, 
increase in Brazil, and decrease in Bolivia.
Dell et al., 
(2009)
GDP Future 1°C temperature 
increase
There is a negative relationship between temperature 
increase and GDP, a relationship that exists both within and 
across countries. Half of negative short-run effects of climate 
change on GDP are offset in the long run due to adaptation.
Poverty dimensions
 Education
 Health and malnutrition or mortality
 Economic income and growth
 Inequalities
 Agricultural output or productivity
 Household consumption 
 Human Development Index composite
*These studies apply to more than one dimension of poverty.
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for poor households than yield changes (Skoufias et 
al., 2011; Hertel and Rosch, 2010). Projected economic 
and demographic growth plays an important part in 
the diversity of responses to temperature changes in 
different countries, yet population growth projections 
are not often incorporated into climate models. As 
such, these models are most usefully interpreted as 
an indication of the direction of the diverse effects of 
climate change on poverty, rather than as a forecast of 
what will happen (Skoufias et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
most studies also do not take adaptation to climate 
change into account as a factor that mediates impact, 
although one study found that up to half of the short-
term negative impacts of climate change could be 
offset through adaptation (Hertel and Rosch, 2010).
The table above presents a summary of evidence 
on climate change-development/poverty links at 
the micro, meso and macro levels, demonstrating a 
diversity of relationships and impacts (Skoufias et al., 
2011; Dercon et al., 2005; Noy, 2009; Hertel et al., 2010; 
Jacoby et al., 2011). It is not an extensive literature 
review but the sample of studies considered is recog-
nised as having important findings on this topic. 
1.4 The geographical location(s) of poverty and 
climate extremes
1.4.1 A co-location of climate change and poverty?
As described above, the impact of climate extremes 
on poverty is mediated by levels of vulnerability and 
exposure. Climate change and poverty each have a 
distinct geography, with high levels of heat, rainfall and 
droughts more prevalent in specific regions (UNISDR, 
2009; IPCC, 2012) and poverty also concentrated in 
particular parts of the world. Nonetheless, the maps 
below show some co-location in terms of regions 
where poverty levels are high and where the largest 
relative changes in temperature and rainfall are 
expected.
Figure 1 (below) shows poverty indicators for 
the period 2010–2012, comparing the share of the 
population living on less than $1.25 per day (the 
poverty indicator used in the SDGs) across developing 
countries. It will come as no surprise that the countries 
with the highest proportion of extreme poverty are 
located in sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast 
Asia. Some places with the highest levels of poverty 
will also see large annual temperature increases and 
changes in precipitation by the end of the century. 
Figure 2 shows a global temperature increase of several 
degrees above the present day, but it can be seen that 
far larger temperature increases are projected over 
much of the land, particularly the Arctic and continents 







Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25
a day (PPP) (% of population)
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in high latitudes. These long-term trends show signifi-
cantly warmer average temperatures and large regions 
of decreasing annual rainfall (e.g. North Africa and 
the Mediterranean, and South Africa) and increasing 
annual rainfall (e.g. South Asia and East Asia). Many of 
these regions also have high concentrations of poverty.
However, an important characteristic often missed 
when discussing global changes is that low-latitude 
tropical regions – due to their relatively stable 
year-round climates – are projected to see some of 
the largest relative changes. This has led them to be 
identified as climate change ‘hot spots’ (Diffenbaugh 
and Giorgi, 2012). In addition, in some regions with 
large year-to-year rainfall variability, such as the Sahel, 
Figure 2. Annual surface temperature and precipitation change
These are maps of annual surface temperature change (darkening to red) and precipitation (darkening to blue) changes by the end of the 21st 
century under a business as usual GHG scenario. Hatching indicates regions where the projected change is relatively small. Stippling indicates regions 
of relatively large changes with high climate model agreement. See IPCC AR5(18) for full description. 
Change in average surface temperature (1986–2005 to 2081–2100) Change in average precipitation (1986–2005 to 2081–2100)
Box 1. Difficulties with climate and poverty hotspot mapping at the sub-national level
In this report, we began by mapping ‘hot spots’ of poverty 
and overlaying these nodes with climate information to 
identify areas vulnerable to climate-related shocks. ‘Hot 
spots’ in Africa were selected according to areas with 
high incidences of malnutrition (using child height-for-age 
Z score as a proxy for long-term nutritional status). 
This approach did not work well: there are a multitude 
of reasons why people are poor and a paucity of direct 
causal evidence regarding how climate-related shocks 
and stresses impact longer-term wellbeing outcomes. Poor 
households deal with idiosyncratic stresses, such as health 
problems or unemployment, in addition to larger structural 
barriers, including poor access to services. Worsening 
climate extremes are one piece of a larger puzzle. 
An initial ‘hot spot’ analysis focused on Kenya, where 
areas of high malnutrition did not match areas of drought 
severity and length. Instead, they corresponded to areas 
of population density. Much of the concentration of 
severe malnutrition is around large metropolitan areas, 
where over 40% of children living in slums are stunted. 
Also, although Kenya’s arid lands have high rates of 
poverty and malnutrition, the absolute numbers of those 
living in deprivation are significantly larger in Kenya’s 
western and central areas. This makes the ‘hotspots’ 
approach of limited use to explain the socioeconomic 
impacts of drought in the north. Ultimately, there is rarely 
a direct geographical relationship between drought and 
concentrations of high malnutrition because economic 
and political factors that play an important role cannot be 
wholly captured through a mapping exercise.
Written by Florence Pichon
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climate model agreement on the scale and sign of 
rainfall change is low. However, due to their already 
sensitive nature, any change in the timing, intensity 
or frequency of rainfall is likely to have relatively large 
impacts in these areas. It is partly for these reasons, 
that it is important to consider local climatic conditions 
when assessing how the poorest parts of the world will 
be affected by climate change.
1.4.2 A co-location of climate extremes and poverty?
The maps in Figures 1 and 2 indicate an overlap 
between countries with high levels of poverty today 
and those that face large annual temperature increases 
and changes in precipitation by the end of the century. 
However, it is far less clear that this relationship holds for 
climate extremes (see box 1), which will potentially have 
a much larger impact on poor people over the next 15 
years. 
Climate scientists generally define an 
extreme as an event in the tail of the 
probability distribution
Understanding climate extremes is more chal-
lenging than interpreting averages for two reasons. 
Firstly, while climate models are useful tools for 
understanding long-term climate trends, their ability 
to forecast changes in extremes is both more limited 
and less well understood. This makes it much more 
difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from maps of 
extremes that are based on climate model projections. 
Secondly, defining what is meant by an extreme event 
is problematic, as this can depend very much on the 
local experience of such weather events. Climate scien-
tists generally define an extreme as an event in the tail 
of the probability distribution. It does not necessarily 
follow that such an event – however extreme it is, 
relative to the climatology – will have a large impact. 
How relevant an extreme actually is, depends on the 
local experience of weather and this is difficult to 
‘map’ in a way that is useful for understanding likely 
impact. The maps of multi-hazard projections that were 
used in the 2013 Geography of poverty, disasters and 
climate extremes report, for example, were based on 
mathematical thresholds of ‘extremeness’, not how the 
events were felt locally. This allowed for a comparison 
between countries but did not provide information on 
actual drought/flood events for individual countries 
or sub-national units within them. More information is 
needed on local sensitivities to climate extremes. We 
need, for example, to have a clear understanding of 
the types of droughts that have the largest impact on 
specific regions and which groups are most vulnerable 
to them.
CHAPTER 2  
Climate extremes on the rise
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2.1 Climate change and extreme events
As our climate has warmed in the past 50 years (IPCC, 
2014a), we have also seen changes in the occurrence 
of extreme events (IPCC, 2012). The climate system is 
inherently chaotic, meaning that additional heat retained 
within the earth system through anthropogenic climate 
change may have non-linear and unexpected impacts 
(James and Washington, 2013). This additional heat 
can affect all aspects of weather and climate (Lorenz, 
1993). We observe these dynamical and thermodynamic 
responses when weather events change in frequency, 
intensity, spatial extent, duration and timing (IPCC, 
2014a). 
While there are some global trends, such as a decrease 
in the number of cold days and nights and an increase in 
the number of warm days and nights, extreme events are 
measured relative to the normal climate in a region, so it 
is most appropriate to discuss them at a local scale and in 
the context of local sensitivities. For example, heat-related 
deaths increase at temperatures over 25°C in England, 
while in the plains areas of India, a heatwave is considered 
to be 40°C or higher (NRDC, 2015; Public Health England, 
2015). In the UK, average temperatures in the summer 
range from 12°C to 22°C, and people are acclimatised to 
this range (Leemans and Cramer, 1991). In contrast, people 
in the plains areas of India regularly experience average 
temperatures of about 34°C during May, the warmest 
month of the year, and ‘extremes’ occur relative to this very 
different ‘normal’ (Leemans and Cramer, 1991). 
The human physiological threshold for heat stress 
Summary
Overall, the science for explaining the relationship 
between global warming and extreme events, and for 
modelling future changes in those extreme events, has 
been improving. However, much is still unknown and 
we are unlikely to ever be able to accurately forecast 
changes in climate extremes. This chapter explores the 
latest science on climate extremes and the extent to 
which recent extreme events are representative of chang-
ing risks due to climate change. It explores the climate 
context for each of the three case studies we present in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5. We examine climate variability and 
extremes in the Sahel, storm surges in the Philippines 
and heatwaves in India. We demonstrate how what was 
once considered unusual in terms of the magnitude, 
frequency and variability of climate phenomena has, in 
some parts of the world, become the ‘new normal’.
• Human activities have been identified as a key driv-
er in the changing climate over the last 50 years; 
the climate has warmed (IPCC, 2014a) and there 
have been changes in the occurrence of extreme 
events (IPCC, 2012). 
• Additional energy in the form of heat in the climate 
system may have non-linear and unexpected 
effects, as the system itself is inherently chaotic. 
• While there are some global trends, it is most 
appropriate to discuss changes at the local scale 
as extremes occur relative to what is normal in a 
specific context. Attribution analyses can examine 
whether local or regional extremes are becoming 
more frequent due to climate change (Stott et al., 
2013; Trenberth et al., 2015).
• In the West African Sahel, large-scale global 
processes in the atmosphere and oceans affect the 
climate for the region where, for the last 50 years, 
“there is no such thing as ‘normal’ rainfall” (Hulme, 
2001:19); recent periods of variability include 
changes in the timing and intensity of rainfall, with 
implications for drought and flood events, and 
downstream impacts on productivity.
• In the Philippines, Super Typhoon Haiyan was an 
extreme event with widespread consequences; the 
climate change footprint was evident in the height 
of the devastating storm surge, which was exac-
erbated by anthropogenic climate change, having 
caused sea level rise (Takayabu et al., 2015). 
• The number of extreme hot days experienced over 
much of the world’s land area continues to rise. In the 
case of India, extreme hot temperatures and heat-
waves were observed throughout the country in 2015.
• Climate extremes like those illustrated by these three 
examples are having dramatic impacts on people’s 
lives, and a growing evidence base articulates how 
climate change is increasing the risk of these events.
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depends on both temperature and relative humidity 
(Sherwood and Huber, 2010). While people do have 
different heat tolerances depending on where they live, 
regions that already have high normal temperatures 
will breach the threshold humans can tolerate more 
often, as the number of warm days and nights increase. 
In tropical and subtropical heat-related stress on 
populations is therefore more common as these places 
already have high temperatures and humidity. High 
humidity reduces our ability to regulate body tempera-
ture through sweating, making it harder for humans to 
tolerate extreme heat stress (Kenney et al., 2004). 
Climate extremes have always impacted on people’s 
lives, however, we are now beginning to see changes 
in the frequency and intensity of these extremes and 
increasing evidence of how climate change is contrib-
uting to these events (e.g. Herring et al., 2014). Figure 
3 below shows how some extremes have changed in 
different parts of the world in the past half-century. 
In this chapter, we focus on several examples of 
extreme events that have had drastic consequences 
on today’s society, illustrating the climate context for 
each one. Disasters occur all over the world and know 
no administrative boundaries. Nevertheless, certain 
countries have suffered disproportionately. In terms of 
numbers of people killed, injured and made homeless 
by natural hazards, the countries selected for this study 
(Mali, India and the Philippines) are amongst the most 
affected by disasters (see figure 4).
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2.2 Climate variability and extremes in the Sahel 
Natural variability occurs on annual, decadal and 
multi-decadal timescales that result in periods of 
drier and wetter conditions. Across decades, regional 
climates vary naturally and are affected by large-scale 
global processes in the atmosphere and oceans. 
These process create, for example, periods when there 
are more extreme wet or dry events, which can be 
catastrophic to vulnerable groups. In some locations, 
the rainy season can vary strongly from one year to 
the next. One region that has experienced high levels 
of variability and extremes in the past 50 years is the 
African Sahel (figure 5). In fact, as Hulme (2001: 19) 
states, “There is no such thing as ‘normal’ rainfall in the 
Sahel.”
The Sahel is a semiarid region in Africa between the 
Sahara desert to the north, and the wetter savannah 
zone to the south. Most livelihoods in the Sahel are 
based on rain-fed agriculture and animal husbandry, 
relying on a single rainy season between June and 
September (Halpert and Bell, 1996). During this season, 
the West African monsoon moves northward from the 
Equator, providing people from the region with an 
opportunity to grow crops and raise livestock that will 
support their families for the entire year. This strong 
dependence on consistently adequate rainfall makes 
the region particularly vulnerable to changes in the 
climate (Sarr et al., 2015; Kandji et al., 2006). 
Oceans located thousands of miles 
away from the Sahel played a key role 
in determining the location, strength 
and extent of the West African monsoon
In the past 50 years the Sahel has changed remark-
ably. The 1950s and 1960s saw a series of consistently 
wet rainy seasons, leading to high agricultural 
productivity, with people expanding cultivation into 
marginal lands near the Sahara desert (Nicholson et 
al., 2012). This period of relative prosperity had ended 
by 1970 and a devastating drought took hold, peaking 
Figure 4. Number of reported victims of natural disaster by 100,000 inhabitants, 1996–2005
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in 1973–4 and contributing to an estimated 100,000 
deaths across sub-Saharan Africa (Kandji et al., 2006). 
The drought led to hunger, malnutrition, soil deterio-
ration and mass migration towards the urban centres 
and southern regions of the Sahel. People abandoned 
the areas they had moved into in the 1950s and instead 
settled in low-lying coastal areas. Dakar, for example, 
saw a population boom, as did nearby towns.
Oceans located thousands of miles away from the 
Sahel played a key role in determining the location, 
strength and extent of the West African monsoon. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the tropical oceans were 
unusually cool and the North Atlantic Ocean was 
unusually warm (Giannini et al. 2013). This pushed 
the monsoon up towards the Sahel, bringing heavy 
rainy seasons every year. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
temperature anomalies in the oceans reversed, keeping 
the monsoon closer to the Equator and resulting in 
much lower rainfall across much of the Sahel (Giannini 
et al., 2013). Such changes are part of the normal cycles 
of the oceans, but these particular changes were also 
affected by anthropogenic smog produced around the 
world at this time (Rotstayn et al., 2002). Because the 
atmosphere abides by no national boundaries, changes 
to our worldwide climate in one place can have drastic 
impacts in other regions. 
Another climatic shift occurred in the mid-1990s, 
when the Sahel started to recover some of its rainfall 
and entered a period characterised by increased 
variability and extremes (Lebel et al., 2009). At the 
same time, the Earth’s atmosphere was warming at an 
unprecedented rate, due to anthropogenic climate 
change, with this contributing to large annual fluctua-
tions in rainfall rates. 
For example, rainfall in 2009 was close to the long-
term average, followed by extremely high rainfall in 
2010, then unusually dry conditions in 2011 (Nicholson, 
2013). This lack of consistency also shows within each 
rainy season. While the total seasonal rainfall may be 
high, the character of precipitation has shifted towards 
fewer, but more intense, rainfall events (Salack et al., 
2014 Ali et al., 2008). The range of rainfall variability 
in time and space matters most for environmental 
and social systems that must adapt to these changing 
climates (Hulme, 2001). Changes in the character of 
rainfall mean there are sometimes dry spells for days 
or weeks at a time, followed by downpours that make 
up a quarter, half or even the total expected seasonal 
rainfall in one day (Ali et al., 2009). This is different from 
the wet period in the 1950s, which exhibited more 
moderate, consistent rainfall over the course of the 
rainy season (Giannini et al., 2013). 
This highly variable and unpredictable ‘new 
normal’ for Sahel rainfall has direct impacts on the 
Figure 5. Sahel precipitation anomalies 1900–2013
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predominantly pastoral livelihoods in the Sahel. 
Pastoralists’ livelihoods are intrinsically linked to seasonal 
cycles, as the agrarian base of the food economy is 
affected by the rainy season, depending on availability 
of pasture and the ability to plant or fish in the river 
basins and great lakes. With increasingly erratic rainfall 
that arrives too early or too late, too much or too little, 
it is difficult for pastoralists to develop a consistent 
strategy to adapt to the changes in rainfall. If people do 
not adapt to increasing variability, this can lead to rising 
vulnerability and reduced absorptive, anticipatory and 
adaptive capacity (Bahadur et al., 2015). In addition, 
rainfall is not the only changing factor in this region; 
changes to temperatures can also affect water availabil-
ity and livelihoods.
2.2.1 What is the role of climate change? 
Rainfall in the Sahel varies due to natural fluctuations 
in the Earth’s climate system. Warming due to 
anthropogenic climate change shapes the way these 
fluctuations work, creating a complex labyrinth of 
causes and effects that has ultimately led to the chang-
ing occurrence of extremes.
The two major drivers of regional climate in the 
Sahel are the tropical oceans and North Atlantic Ocean 
(Giannini et al., 2003; Zeng, 2003). Climate change 
has caused the tropical oceans to warm, particularly 
around the Gulf of Guinea. This makes it more difficult 
for rain-bearing clouds to form, in turn resulting in 
less rain. However, the North Atlantic Ocean has 
also been warmer than normal and this makes extra 
moisture available to fuel the West African monsoon. 
Each of these two opposing drivers actively resists the 
influence of the other, partly explaining why climate 
variability in the Sahel has increased in recent decades 
(Giannini et al., 2003). Further research by Dong and 
Sutton contends that human-caused greenhouse gases 
and aerosols may be partly responsible for increased 
variability (2015).
Scientific research has shown that the recent trend 
of increasing variability is linked to climate change 
and will continue to remain an important factor 
influencing the amount, intensity and timing of rains 
in the Sahel (Giannini, 2010). The future of the Sahel, 
intricately linked to the changing climate through the 
temperature of the oceans as well as the land, under-
scores the need for understanding the region-specific 
implications of climate science to inform initiatives to 
build resilience to climate extremes.
2.3 Storm surge: Super Typhoon Haiyan
While variability is always a factor in today’s world, 
very extreme events can have shocking consequences. 
Around the globe we occasionally experience events 
that break all prior records, partly because improbable 
events do happen, but also because climate change is 
making these abnormal events more likely. One very 
extreme event was Super Typhoon Haiyan, which tore 
through the Philippines in 2013, leaving a wake of 
massive destruction. Haiyan had an impact on millions 
of people in the Philippines, Micronesia, Vietnam and 
South China, and there were over six thousand con-
firmed deaths, mostly due to storm surge (NDRRMC, 
2014; Lagmay et al., 2015). 
Typhoons, hurricanes and tropical cyclones are 
all the same type of storm, given different names 
according to which ocean they occur in. In the Western 
Pacific Ocean they are given the moniker ‘Typhoon’, 
with the Joint Typhoon Warning Center using a Tropical 
Cyclone Intensity Scale that defines the intensity of 
a storm by the 1-minute maximum sustained wind 
speeds. Other regional warning centres use slightly 
different metrics (World Meteorological Organization, 
2012).
A storm must achieve sustained wind speeds of 
at least 241 km/hr to be classified as a super typhoon 
(World Meteorological Organization, 2012). According 
to the Japan Meteorological Agency, Haiyan’s peak 
1-minute sustained wind speed was 315 km/hr, making 
it the strongest tropical cyclone ever observed in terms 
of peak winds (Yi et al., 2015; Blunden and Arndt, 
2014). The central pressure, a key measure of cyclonic 
strength, was very low at 895mb, leading to a raised 
sea surface because there was less downward pressure 
exerted on the water. To add to this, Haiyan was vast – 
600km from one side to the other – meaning its impact 
was felt across a huge area (Lagmay et al., 2015).
According to the Philippines authorities, Haiyan 
was one of the most powerful typhoons to make 
landfall in recorded history (Mahar et al., 2014). Perhaps 
Haiyan’s most important property, however, was 
the storm surge – a bulge of water that can plough 
through homes, roads and bridges, and rapidly causes 
the water level to rise in coastal communities, leaving 
little time for residents to escape. Haiyan’s storm 
surge, which at its largest was between five and six 
metres high, was responsible for many of the lives lost 
(Lagmay et al., 2015). 
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2.3.1 What is the role of climate change?
The height of Haiyan’s storm surge would not have 
been as extreme in a world without anthropogenic 
climate change (Takayabu et al., 2015). Globally, 
sea levels are rising due to climate change for two 
primary reasons: firstly, ice is melting from the land 
and entering the oceans and, secondly, the oceans are 
expanding as they warm (Nicholls and Cazenave, 2010). 
There is an observed global trend of increasing sea 
levels, but precise changes vary according to location. 
The Philippines in particular is an area of the world 
where sea level has been regionally increasing faster 
than the global average. Based on historical records, 
the increase in sea level near the Philippines in the past 
150 years is estimated at between 0.25 and 0.3 metres 
(Takayabu et al., 2015). 
One study modelled Typhoon Haiyan to see how 
sea level rise might have affected the outcome, 
comparing it to a hypothetical event in a world without 
climate change. They estimated that climate change 
had contributed up to a 20% increase in Haiyan’s storm 
surge near Tacloban, a city that experienced some of 
the most widespread surge damage (Takayabu et al., 
2015). This 20% increase translated into additional 
casualties and increased economic losses. 
While it is clear that climate change increased the 
strength and impact of Haiyan’s storm surges, leading 
to deadly impacts, there is not yet enough information 
to conclude whether it also affected other aspects 
of the storm, such as the intensity of wind and rain. 
Moreover, societal factors, including the way in which 
warnings were issued and interpreted, also factored 
into the high number of casualties from Super Typhoon 
Haiyan.
Lessons learned about storm surge could be 
applied elsewhere; there are, for example, a number 
of megacities worldwide that are vulnerable to sea 
level rise and tropical cyclones that can cause this type 
of surge event, including New Orleans in the USA, 
Shenzhen in China and Nagoya in Japan (Hallegatte et 
al., 2013). 
2.4 Heatwaves in India
Extreme heat is one of the most easily identified 
impacts of climate change, which is itself also referred 
to as ‘global warming’. As far back as 2004, when 
scientists analysed the devastating 2003 heatwave in 
Europe, it was identified that human-induced climate 
change had at least doubled the risk of such a strong 
heatwave (Stott et al., 2004). More recently, record 
temperatures in Australia in 2013 were shown to be 
five times more likely than in a world without climate 
change (Lewis and Karoly, 2013). Although there was 
discussion of a hiatus in the rise of the global average 
surface temperature in the decade beginning in 2000 
(Tollefson, 2014), the number of extreme hot days has 
been rising steadily in most of the world since 1997 
(Seneviratne et al., 2014).
Around the world, heat extremes are on the rise 
(Smith et al., 2013; Perkins et al., 2012; Alexander 
et al., 2006) and the effects can be exacerbated 
locally by urban heat island effects and poor air 
quality (e.g. Zhang 2013; Wilby, 2008). Global trends in 
extreme temperatures make it likely that heatwaves 
will increase almost everywhere; climate model projec-
tions suggest extreme heat increases are likely across 
most of the planet (Sillmann et al., 2013). 
The changing climate is also 
projected to affect the timing, 
frequency and intensity of rainfall 
across South Asia
The 2015 heatwave in India is an example of one 
such climate extreme. May is the hottest month of 
the year across much of the country, immediately 
preceding the monsoon rains. In May 2015, heatwaves 
with incredibly high temperatures of 45 to 48°C were 
recorded in many cities and towns across the country, 
particularly in the south-central region (Burke, 2015). 
During each heatwave, extreme temperatures were 
sustained for days. 
2.4.1 What is the role of climate change?
Evidence suggests a trend of increasing temperatures 
across much of India, with an increase in ‘high tem-
perature days’ (greater than 37°C during March-June) 
since the 1990s in many places (Jaswal et al., 2015). 
Severe heatwaves have happened in the past in India, 
including very severe events in 2010, 2012 and 2009 
(Jaswal et al., 2015). While the relatively short obser-
vational record has not (yet) reflected a statistically 
significant increase in the frequency of heatwaves in 
this region (Mishra et al., 2015), an increased frequency 
of warm days and reduction of cold extremes can point 
to increased risks (e.g. Panda et al., 2014; Jaswal et al., 
2015). We expect the underlying mechanics of climate 
change to affect temperatures in this region, but there 
are other factors at play as well, including topography, 
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changes in rainfall patterns and local air pollution. 
Paradoxically, the latter can have a cooling effect to 
counter-balance rising temperatures due to climate 
change (Kothawale et al., 2012).
Year-to-year climate variations, such as El Niño, can 
also affect heat and rainfall; El Niño years have been 
linked to late monsoons and widespread droughts in 
India allowing for extreme heat to affect the region 
before the cooling rains arrive (Kumar et al., 2006). 
The changing climate is also projected to affect the 
timing, frequency and intensity of rainfall across 
South Asia. Natural rainfall variations will continue to 
dominate year-to-year differences around the mid-21st 
century, but the longer-term trend is for increases in 
both the mean and extreme precipitation of the Indian 
summer monsoon. In addition, climate change may 
increase the year-to-year variability of monsoon rainfall 
across South Asia (IPCC, 2014a).
One important unknown is the relationship 
between climate change and the monsoon cycle 
(Turner and Annamaliai, 2012). Any change in the 
timing, intensity or frequency of the monsoonal rains 
in India could cause significant challenges if people are 
forced to cope with hot, pre-monsoon conditions over 
a longer period. This would be an added dimension to 
the uncertainty already faced across the region.
CHAPTER 3  
Drought, complex shocks  
and poverty in Mali
26 Climate extremes and resilient poverty reduction
Summary 
The case of drought in Mali, underscores the complex and 
dynamic relationship between climate extremes, poverty 
and development. Climatic and political events like those 
experienced over the last decade present a considerable 
challenge for building resilience: efforts will have to 
face the dual challenge of tackling system-wide shocks 
with drivers that extend beyond national borders, while 
attending to the differentiated impacts of these shocks on 
poverty and wellbeing. Although rainfall has recovered to 
some extent since the end of the great Sahelian drought in 
the 1980s, it still remains well below levels during the four 
decades prior to the 1960s. With over three quarters of the 
workforce engaged in agrarian livelihoods, water stress is 
a driver of food as well as income insecurity. The central 
(Segou) region serves as an effective distribution hub for 
cereal production, with the pressures of both a changing 
climate and political uncertainty effectively expanding 
chronic food insecurity southward (Funk et al., 2012).
Analysis of rainfall patterns over the last century 
reveals a significant degree of variability. This is intrinsic 
to the hydroclimatic conditions of the Sahel. Yet climate 
models also concur that Mali will see a potential decrease 
in rainfall over coming decades due to anthropogenic 
climate change. This compounds growing human pressure 
on the major transboundary rivers, whose flows to some 
extent also regulate Mali’s seasonal climate (Zwarts, 2010). 
Malians whose livelihoods depend on natural land, water, 
pasture, forest and fish resources in the inland delta region 
report experiencing more frequent drought cycles in the 
annual flood patterns upon which they depend because 
of development pressure from upstream abstraction and 
dams. The balance between human and natural drivers 
of poverty in this context is therefore complex. Continuing 
uncertainty regarding the localised impacts of climate 
projections within Mali only serves to reinforce the 
argument that effective responses must be robust in the 
face of likely climate extremes. Planning for an increasingly 
hot and variable climate as perhaps the most likely of a 
range of possible futures, would seem prudent. Key points 
to consider here are:
• As one of the ten poorest countries in the world, 
Mali is highly vulnerable to drought and flood events. 
Since the great Sahelian drought, it has suffered 
shorter and more unpredictable drought cycles, 
with a series of drought-related crises in 2010, 
2011 and 2012. 
• Mali is already experiencing climate change impacts 
on agriculture. Heat stress with a warming climate 
(conservatively estimated at a rate of over .2° Celsius 
per decade) has been projected to significantly reduce 
animal and plant production with consequent spikes in 
food prices if nothing is done to make Mali’s agriculture 
more climate-resilient (Sogoba et al., 2014). 
• The poverty impacts of water stress do not map neatly 
onto places where the climate signal is strongest, 
and are instead centred as much on areas where 
poor people are most exposed to fluctuations in food 
prices. This is illustrated in the cascade of shocks 
that occur when the crops that household food and 
income depend on fail, as shortages trigger food price 
volatility (Benson and Clay, 1998). 
• Average rainfall remains consistently below levels 
from the period 1961–1990, causing fluctuations in 
the duration of the growing season. This in turn led to 
insecure agricultural production and degradation of 
the soil and vegetative cover, both of which are keys 
to restoration and intensification of climate-resilient 
production (Konate and Sokona, 2003). 
• Despite the above, a number of initiatives – including 
technological innovations in agriculture, improved 
agrometeorological services, and better regional 
coordination for early warning systems – have been 
instrumental in reducing drought impacts on poverty 
and food security in Mali (Konate and Sokona, 2003).
• Early warning systems, climate monitoring and har-
vest monitoring have been shown to help anticipate 
food crises and reduce poverty, but there is, none-
theless, disconnect between the climate information 
systems and the interventions based on information 
provided (USAID, 2015).
• Lack of coordination across scales – from major 
transboundary river basin systems to national and 
decentralised municipal districts – has held back 
consideration of climate change risks in local devel-
opment plans and undermined execution and scaling 
up of effective drought management strategies 
(Sogoba et al., 2014).
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3.1 The impact of drought
The impacts of drought are complex and far-reaching, 
often spreading well beyond the place where drought 
occurs (Sheffield et al., 2014).1 Consequences are com-
pounded and shaped by the characteristics of the eco-
nomic and agricultural systems of the affected area, as 
well as environmental factors (Benson and Clay, 1998). 
Droughts have short- and long-term consequences, 
along with direct and indirect impacts on the poor. 
Short-term consequences include drops in production 
and loss of food availability and livestock assets, 
triggering malnutrition and food insecurity. Longer-
term consequences include chronic dependence on 
humanitarian assistance and stunting in children. Thus, 
drought effects on harvests and livestock production 
spread to impact on household income, food security 
and livelihoods. They also affect agricultural added 
value and GDP in countries such as Mali, which heavily 
rely on the agricultural sector (figure 6). These effects 
may be transitory but, depending of the size of the 
event and the sensitivity of the system, they can also 
have long-term consequences, pushing people or 
countries into poverty, and permanently degrading or 
reducing productive assets and human capital.
Through their impact on future harvests and farm 
incomes, droughts have a lag effect on the nutritional 
status of children. Sen (1981) describes how drought 
leads to reductions in income, with direct impacts on 
household welfare in the short and long-term, forcing 
households to reduce consumption and investments 
in their productive inputs and assets. In emergencies, 
households resort to selling productive assets, limiting 
their future income earning potential (Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger, 1993; Morduch, 1995). The consequences 
of reduced consumption for pregnant mothers and 
young children unfold over the long-term, resulting 
in nutritional stunting, worse school performance and 
lower life expectancy for children in comparison to their 
peers (Dercon and Hoddinott, 2003; Ferreira and Schady, 
2009; Alderman, 2011). Climate impacts are also highly 
gendered, with girls often kept out of school to help 
in the household economy and girls are more likely to 
receive insufficient food during times of food shortage, 
in comparison to their male counterparts (Hadley et al., 
2008).
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The contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP in Mali is higher in years with higher rainfall, but this correlation is not perfect. This is due to the fact 
that the definition of drought is more complex than rainfall deficit and the overall economy can be affected by other shocks and stresses.
Source: World Bank (2015d)
1. UNISDR figures report that, in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), droughts account for less than 20% of natural disasters but account for over 80% of the 
affected population (Sheffield et al.,2014).
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3.2 Mali: droughts, shocks and poverty
Mali has one of the highest population growth rates 
in the world (World Bank, 2015a) and, in 2010, half its 
people lived on less than US$1.25 a day. On top of this, 
drought and conflict have increased the incidence 
of poverty in the country in the last five years (World 
Bank, 2015a). Recent events include a drought-induced 
crisis amongst northern pastoralists in 2010, a wider 
regional drought in 2011, and a regional political and 
security crisis in 2012 and 2013 that is still having 
lingering effects. In 2014, Mali ranked 176th on the 
United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) in 
2014, putting it among the ten poorest countries in 
the world (Malik, 2014). The experience of Mali shows 
how recurrent droughts, combined with governance, 
security and resulting economic shocks, can create a 
complex set of dynamics that entrench poverty and 
undermine resilience from the household and commu-
nity levels through to national scales. 
The EMDAT international database of disasters 
recorded 5,125,000 people in Mali being affected by 
drought over the course of five major events from 
2000–2015 (Guha-Sapir et al., n.d.). Since records are 
not consistent over the last 20 years, this number 
cannot be compared with earlier major droughts in 
the 1980s and 1990s. For example increases in the 
number of people affected by drought over time may 
reflect improved tracking of drought impacts, as well 
as growing vulnerability to drought. The measurement 
of direct and indirect drought impacts remains a chal-
lenge, as does assessing drought-related losses. The 
difficulty in measuring indirect impacts in particular 
is a barrier to understanding whether resilience is 
dropping or data collection is improving.
Reported linkages between water stress, food secu-
rity and political security (Arsenault, 2015) are backed 
up by a growing body of literature. The Brookings 
Institute has published a study showing that for each 
1% change in average temperature and rainfall, there 
is a corresponding 4% increase in the frequency of 
cross-border violence (Kälin, 2008). Meanwhile, inter-
group violence, such as that which plagues Mali, goes 
up by 14%. This study foresees an explicit link between 
climate change and conflict:
“A decrease in essential resources due to climate 
change (water; food production) most likely will 
trigger armed conflict and violence: This is most 
likely to affect regions that have reduced water 
availability and that cannot easily adapt (e.g. by 
switching to economic activities requiring less 
water) due to poverty. These armed conflicts may 
last for as long as resource scarcity continues. This in 
turn would impede the chances of reaching peace 
agreements which provide for the equitable sharing 
of the limited resources and thus prolong the 
conflicts, leading to more situations of protracted 
displacement” (Kälin, 2008).
Population and political pressures fuelled by water 
and heat stress put growing pressure on fragile, over- 
exploited and poorly managed natural resource sys-
tems. Inter-communal conflict is of increasing concern 
north of the inland delta in Mali, where pastoralists 
face an influx of people from other regions. Some of 
these displaced people are drought-driven and in need 
of grazing land, while others have domestic or wider 
political and militant motivations. It is also possible that 
some (of each of these groups) exploit the instability 
created by insurgency to engage in criminal activity.
3.2.1 Recurrent drought-related shocks
Agriculture accounts for 40% of Mali’s GDP (World 
Bank, 2015a). Agro-pastoral production depends 
on one rainy season and one crop cycle each year, 
making the country highly vulnerable to drought and 
flood events (FEWS, 2015a). The country’s northern 
zone is characterised by pastoralism, its central zone 
by sedentary integrated cereal-livestock production 
systems and its small south western zone by sedentary 
cotton-cereal-livestock production systems. With 80% 
of the population engaged in agriculture, only 7% of 
43.7 million arable hectares are currently cultivated, 
and only 14% of 2.2 million potentially irrigable 
hectares currently irrigated. Mali’s economy relies 
heavily on rainfed agriculture and livestock production, 
and almost 30% of the population is malnourished 
(USAID, 2015).
As the rainy season began in late 
2011, uneven rainfall distribution 
once again led to weak rainfed crop 
development and widespread low 
cereal yields
The majority of Mali’s agricultural land area lies in 
the Sahel where, as already discussed in chapter 2, 
rainfall is extremely variable. Prolonged periods of low 
rainfall during the 1980s and 1990s had significant food 
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security consequences, and rainfall levels continue to 
decline. Two years of low and erratic rainfall, in 2008 
and 2009, led to a crisis amongst Mali’s pastoralists in 
2010. Insufficient regeneration of northern pastures 
after the dry season and the resulting biomass deficit 
limited livestock development, and pastoralists were 
forced to begin their seasonal migration prematurely 
and move unusually far. Many livestock perished, and 
mass destocking in order to limit further losses led to 
a glut of livestock in the market. A consequent sharp 
drop of about one third in livestock prices in turn led 
to a reverse in the livestock-cereal exchange rate, 
which affected the entire Sahel region (Réseau Billital 
Maroobé, 2010). The pastoralist crisis thus resulted in a 
decline in the income and assets of not only the pasto-
ralists, but also the sedentary smallholder farmers. 
A year later, West Africa was again widely affected 
by erratic rainfall, with the result that the 2011 cereal 
harvest in Mali was down by 54,420,000 tonnes (about 
10%) on the previous year (CILSS, 2012). The World 
Food Programme reported 60% of Malian households 
surveyed after the rainy season had no harvest at all 
(Diarra and Togola, 2012). On average, agricultural 
production for the 2010/2011 season covered only 
three to four months of the country’s food needs, down 
from six to nine months in a ‘normal’ year. 
Some consequences of drought continue to be felt 
in the ten months following the rainy season, especially 
during the dry season a year after a production deficit 
that was triggered by low rainfall (FEWS, 2015a). Thus, 
as the rainy season began in late 2011, uneven rainfall 
distribution once again led to weak rainfed crop devel-
opment and widespread low cereal yields. There was 
almost no harvest in the cotton-cereal-livestock-pro-
ducing Sikasso region in the far south west, usually 
the wettest area of the country. In the north western, 
Sahelian area, where Mali borders Mauritania, low 
and unevenly distributed rainfall caused both a drop 
in agricultural production and a shortage of forage, 
negatively affecting household incomes. 
Access to food became a major problem across 
the whole of the Western Sahel during the 2011/12 
drought. The drop in production led to price spikes 
affecting food access for the more vulnerable. The 
World Food Programme (Diarra and Togola, 2012) 
identified five particularly vulnerable groups: landless 
farmers, pastoralists without livestock, nomads being 
settled into farming activities, women and children. 
The lack of production also transformed poor farmers, 
reliant on subsistence production, into net buyers of 
cereals. Poor people living in urban areas were also 
affected through the reduction in food availability and 
rising prices linked to shortages. 
The impact of this food crisis was compounded by 
political instability, conflict and weak governance, with 
a military coup in March 2012 and the subsequent 
rebellion of Tuaregs and militant Islamist groups, 
which put the north of the country beyond the control 
of the national government (World Bank, 2015a). By 
April 2012, at least 270,000 people and their livestock 
had been displaced by the conflict, with over 161,000 
going into neighbouring countries such as Burkina 
Faso, Niger and Mauritania. Nearly 100,000 cattle 
are thought to have been driven across the border 
into Burkina Faso, aggravating the risk of conflict 
over increasingly scarce natural resources such as 
pasture and water (CILSS, 2012). By the end of the 
year, most of the population of northern Mali was 
classified by FEWS, the Sahel region’s Famine Early 
Warning System, as food insecure (FEWS, 2015b), not 
least because the conflict had limited humanitarian 
responses to the drought. 
By March 2014, 1.5 million people were still con-
sidered food insecure in Mali. During that dry season, 
40% of people in the north of the country were facing 
difficulties in finding their next meal (WFP, 2014). In 
2015, across the whole country, an estimated 660,000 
children were believed to be at risk of acute malnu-
trition, with 25% of Malian households considered as 
food insecure – around 40% in the north of the country. 
A survey conducted in March 2015 by the World Food 
Programme defines the country’s food insecurity as 
structural, driven by the poverty situation in conjunc-
tion with climate, political and social crises (WFP, 2015).
3.3 A complex relationship between drought 
and poverty 
The compounding impact of the shocks described 
above is a significant driver of Mali’s current national 
poverty situation. The World Food Programme Surveys 
of the 2012 and 2015 droughts established a clear link 
between these drought events and levels of poverty 
(WFP, 2012; WFP, 2015), but the impacts of drought 
appear not to be limited to the geographic location 
where the drought occurs. The two maps in figure 7 
compare the geography of malnutrition prevalence 
in Mali (in 2006) with the geography of high exposure 
to drought events (for the period 1981–2010). These 
maps show there is no clear geographical co-location 
of the two phenomena: there are no obvious ‘hot spots’ 
where climate extremes and poverty intersect. 
Figure 7 shows that children’s height-for-age z-score 
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(HAZ) indicator, a proxy for long-term nutritional 
status (Linnemayr et al., 2008), was high throughout 
the country in 2006, at more than 20% in all regions. 
The distribution of stunted children in the population 
was particularly high in the north and extreme south.2 
The 2006 situation presented is representative of 
structural food insecurity over the period 2001–2006 
(the HAZ-score is a stock variable along the life of the 
children and we are focussing on those under the age 
of five). Several sensitivity tests have been performed 
to define poverty using drought indicators (such as 
average length of drought or average severity), but the 
geographical correlation between poverty and average 
length of drought over time remains low. 
Care should be taken in interpreting this however, 
as the map used here to represent drought is only one 
measure of this phenomenon and highlights the relative 
characteristics of drought for each location. The drought 
indicator values are relative to climate characteristics 
of each region and so whilst the percentage severity 
is greater in the North, more rainfall is expected in the 
south (on average) and so a less severe drought here may 
actually have a greater impact on the local population.
Moreover, the geographical distribution of chronic 
malnutrition does not correspond directly to those 
areas that experienced the most severe droughts 
between 1981 and 2010 (according to the measure of 
drought used here). The drought map shows that there 
are no specific “hotspots” of drought over Mali with 
this indicator and in general the whole country will 
be affected by drought at the same time, as these are 
often regional-scale events. The areas with the highest 
share of stunted children do not therefore correspond 
to areas of particularly high drought intensity. 
The fact that there is no simple geographical correla-
tion between the two phenomena also suggests a more 
complex picture in terms of vulnerability to drought. 
Young children of farming families least habituated to 
severe drought may be more vulnerable to drought 
extremes, while families more accustomed to drought 
may exhibit some degree of resilience to stunting. 
The analysis of the map does not take into account 
migration of families and individuals away from affected 
areas (often to urban areas), and remittance flows from 
urban to rural areas that may serve to mitigate losses 
for rural households (Benson and Clay, 1998). Overall, 
understanding the sensitivity of the systems which 
people rely on (e.g. food access, economic activity, and 
Figure 7. Geography of malnutrition and drought in Mali
Map based on 1981–2010 daily rainfall data from Era-Interim (Dee et al., 
2011) and calculated using the Moving Average Precipitation Variable 
Threshold drought indicator (Wanders et al., 2010). An event of 100% 
severity indicates no rainfall during the identified drought days. Drought 
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2. The height-for-age indicator measures the long-term nutritional status, the indicator reflects the chronic malnutrition and the stunting status. 
Height-for-age z-score is a proxy of health stock reflecting current and past health investments (Linnemayr et al. 2008). We consider this indicator 
a good proxy for poverty as the structural nutritional status in Mali is mainly driven by poverty (WFP, 2015). The height-for-age z-score indicator is 
calculated as the difference between the child’s height-for-age and the median height-for-age for the same aged reference population divided by the 
standard deviation of the reference population.
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water availability) would help us to better understand 
the complexity of the relationship between climate and 
poverty in Mali.
While the map of the distribution of stunted children 
is arguably a good proxy for vulnerability and sensitivity 
of households to the effects of poverty, drought clearly 
affects whole economic systems, meaning its effects 
on vulnerable households are spread throughout the 
economy. Households are just as likely to be impacted 
in urban or densely-populated areas, where demand is 
sensitive to food price fluctuations and cereal availabil-
ity, as places where high numbers of drought days have 
a direct impact on agricultural production. The effect 
of drought on the incomes and food security of small-
holder farmers is complex and depends on whether 
they are net sellers of produce or subsistence farmers, 
as well as the size of the drought and how drops 
in production are reflected in prices. If the drought 
leads to higher prices, farmers who are net sellers can 
obtain higher benefits. This is less likely to happen for 
subsistence farmers however who will become net 
buyers of cereal after a drop in production and will be 
directly affected by price spikes and lack of access to 
cereal. The effect on the household economy is clearly 
different in each case and appears to have more to do 
with the coping strategies that are available. Initiatives 
geared towards building resilience to drought should 
not only focus on drought location areas but also on the 
need, as well as opportunities, to build resilience across 
the system. 
3.4 Building resilience to drought 
The agricultural sector is the foundation of Mali’s econ-
omy but nonetheless suffers from low productivity, 
post-harvest crop losses, under-developed markets 
and vulnerability to climate change. However, the 
potential for agriculture growth and expansion, driving 
more broad-based economic growth, is promising 
(USAID, 2015). A number of initiatives have been instru-
mental in reducing the impact of drought on poverty 
and food security in Mali. These include agricultural 
innovation, weather monitoring and the development 
of early warning systems for Mali and the whole of the 
Sahel. The following section highlights initiatives that 
have been important in anticipating, absorbing and 
adapting to the impacts of drought. These include: 
• sustainable intensification through drought-toler-
ant seeds and water resource systems management, 
soil-building and fertiliser management 
• risk management measures, including Weather 
Index Insurance, early warning/early action systems 
and climate information, social protection and 
safety nets 
• value chain development, through input/output 
market improvements and livelihood diversification, 
including moving up and out of agriculture.
3.4.1 Technological innovation to strengthen resilience 
to drought
Poverty alleviation is directly linked to agriculture, 
whether in the form of drought-resilient crop 
varieties, improved livestock breeding or changes in 
farming practices and planting choices. Agricultural 
technologies have the potential to significantly boost 
production and reduce spoilage and loss due to risks 
such as pests and pathogens. They also improve the 
nutritional quality of food grown and consumed by 
farming households (Kelsey, 2013). 
The development and adoption of drought-tolerant 
crop varieties, for example, allows farmers to better 
manage drought and has already proved effective 
in mitigating some of its impacts (Shiferaw et al., 
2014). Drought-tolerant crops such as pearl millet, 
cowpea, groundnut and sorghum, along with crops 
with drought-tolerant varieties like maize, can 
optimise production in contexts where water for 
agriculture is limited (Xoconostle-Cazares et al., 2010). 
However, realising the potential gains from the use 
of drought-tolerant crops and varieties depends on 
farmers adopting new seeds and cultivars. This, in turn, 
relies on them being available on time and at afforda-
ble prices. While current trends show an overall growth 
in the adoption of improved crops, sub-Saharan Africa 
lags behind other parts of the world (Kelsey, 2013).
The impacts of drought can be managed all along 
the agricultural value chain, but crop production is 
one of the most exposed and sensitive segments, 
with many constraints impeding adoption of new 
technologies. Identifying the constraints and which 
can be effectively reduced or removed, can serve as a 
framework for assessing the viability of new technolog-
ical approaches and help build enabling environment 
for adoption.
3.4.2 Informing to anticipate: the National 
Meteorological Agency
When to plant is the most critical decision to make 
in crop agriculture, followed by a series of cultivation 
decisions traditionally timed according to local weather 
and biological indicator systems. Due to a changing 
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climate and especially as a consequence of decades of 
Sahelian drought, many traditional indicator species 
used by farmers in the past have now died out and 
weather patterns are unlikely to return to any prior 
‘normal’. The need for crop calendars led Mali’s national 
meteorological service in the 1980s to begin to 
develop fairly sophisticated agro-hydrometeorological 
forecasting for different crops and regions. While use 
of these forecasts for planting and cultivation has 
contributed to some recovery in the agricultural sector, 
there is always room for improvement in making such 
advisories more accessible and actionable by farmers. 
In recognition of this, the National Meteorological 
Agency in Mali (Mali Météo) is now involved in a broad 
programme of meteorological assistance for agricul-
ture. The aim is to respond to farmers’ needs in terms of 
limiting risk and loss, decreasing the cost of production 
and improving productivity. Since 2001, local and 
communal Meteorological Assistance groups have 
been created in different parts of the country. These 
groups, backed up by the Multidisciplinary Working 
Group for Meteorological Services in Rural Areas 
(WGIP), support the production and dissemination of 
agro-meteorological products and information about 
the evolution of each agropastoral season. To date, 
over 1,800 male and female farmers have been trained 
in rainfall recording and crop observation, while more 
than 500 advisers have been trained to provide them 
with guidance developed by the WGIP. The programme 
has already yielded important results, helping to 
anticipate climate and production stresses and adapt 
practices and production accordingly (USAID, 2014b).
Recent work has resulted in the 
development of a harmonised 
framework for the analysis and 
identification of high-risk areas and 
vulnerable groups across the region
Soil nutrient depletion is a major barrier to improv-
ing crop yields in Africa. Rainfed production systems 
do not allow a systematic optimisation of fertiliser, 
because of rainfall variability (Dimes et al., 2003). 
Adaptive fertilisation management relies on a better 
understanding of rainfall distribution through seasonal 
climate forecasting. If such information was available 
and used effectively, it could also translate into more 
efficient management and use of both water and soil 
nutrients (Holden and Shiferaw, 2004).
3.4.3 Regional institutions and agreements to anticipate 
and absorb
Efforts towards more coordinated regional action to 
anticipate and absorb the impacts of drought have 
been ongoing since the founding of the Permanent 
Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel 
(CILSS), in the wake of the great Sahelian drought of 
1973. Recent work has resulted in the development 
of a harmonised framework for the analysis and 
identification of high-risk areas and vulnerable groups 
across the region. Through this framework of regionally 
integrated drought management information, CILSS 
produces a regular early warning system newsletter on 
the cereal production situation and seasonal rainfall 
projection, which also includes an assessment of food 
security. This helps keep policy-makers and commu-
nities informed, target sensitive areas and highlight 
future food security challenges. CILSS also provides 
technical support and training to policy-makers 
through Agrhymet (CILLS, 2012).
Mali’s membership in the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) means its 
food security situation and economic stability depend 
not only on its own agricultural production, but also 
on that of neighbouring countries. Regional economic 
integration should help ensure food security by: 
• smoothing shocks through enabling access to food 
in areas facing deficits
• promoting agricultural price stability
• increasing farm income 
(Brunelin and Portugal-Perez, 2013). 
ECOWAS and UEMOA also work with CILSS through 
the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RCPA); this 
coordination at the regional scale helps anticipate and 
produce a coordinated response when crises occur.
This combination of early warning systems and 
monitoring of climate, harvests and prices has helped 
prevent food crises in Sahel region (Brunelin, 2015). 
However, assessing a crisis situation in time does not 
always result in timely interventions and emergency 
response measures, for several reasons (Brunelin, 2015).
The traditional focus on food production indicators to 
prevent food crises, instead of an overall assessment 
using prices as early warning indices at the national 
level, provides part of the explanation (Bonjean, 2010). 
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This focus is changing, however, and price indices 
are now being more systematically integrated at the 
national and regional levels. Nonetheless, the integra-
tion of market information in drought prevention still 
faces challenges regarding the availability and quality 
of data, lack of a regional approach to data analysis and 
complexity of using price information to detect and 
anticipate a crisis.
The focus of early warning and drought monitoring 
systems are primarily at the national level and on 
the agricultural sector, which partly accounts for the 
delayed response to the 2010 crisis (RBM, 2010). Lack of 
monitoring of the livestock sector, along with a more 
general lack of sub-national targeting and reports 
reflects the remote geographic location and low geo-
political importance of pastoralist livelihoods. These 
livelihoods have faced a long-standing bureaucratic 
and policy bias across the Sahel, undermining the suit-
ability of this mode of life and livelihood, for vast 
regions under increasing water stress in the context of 
climate change. 
The lack of coordination between regional, national 
and sub-national entities on risk management 
measures is also an important challenge. Vulnerability 
analysis at a sub-national level remains poor and 
does not enable efficient targeting when a crisis does 
happen. To date, decentralised authorities do not have 
drought management responsibilities. They also lack 
the human and financial means to support coordinated 
action or play a linkage role in managing droughts 
or other disasters. 
Finally, the recurrent nature of crises and drought 
periods described in the previous section is also a 
major challenge for the sustainability of drought and 
food crisis management systems. In the Sahel, a good 
harvest seldom compensates for the past year’s severe 
drought; in Niger, for example, households need three 
years, on average, to fully recover from a drought (Ballo 
and Bauer, 2013). Crisis interventions covering one 
agricultural season cannot tackle an accumulation 
of shocks, meaning the long-term consequences 
of drought challenge the utility of traditional early 
warning systems. 
3.5 Future climate change: geographic and 
socio-economic inequalities
Looking forward, Mali faces continued climatic and 
socio-economic uncertainty. Most climate models 
project an increase in temperature and annual rainfall 
across the Sahel, as well as more intense precipitation 
events (Niang, et al., 2014). Projections of the 
magnitude of change that Mali is likely to see differ 
between models, as do predictions of the direction 
of change from region to region within the country. It 
is important to note, however, that the dynamic and 
sensitive nature of the climate in West Africa, as well as 
the region’s high levels of exposure and vulnerability to 
climate risk, means even small changes in the climate 
could have significant impacts on local populations 
and development. The case of drought in Mali 
underscores the complex dynamics between recurrent 
drought and its impact on poverty and development. 
However, it also highlights the progressive onset of 
climate changes if global emissions remain insuffi-
ciently in check. These could exceed the biological 
tolerances of adaptation for crops and even livestock in 
large parts of Mali, requiring a much greater emphasis 
on intensification of production in the fertile and 
irrigable river basin regions of the country. This would 
also necessitate a concomitant emphasis on diversifi-
cation of livelihoods for populations in the most heat 
and water-stressed parts of Mali in the future. The 
factors determining these dynamics – which range 
from the changing climate to international commodity 
prices – are numerous. They are also often beyond the 
influence of communities or governments (Benson and 
Clay, 1998). As such, efforts at building resilience face 
the dual challenge of tackling system-wide shocks with 
drivers that extend beyond national borders, while 
attending to the highly differentiated impacts of these 
shocks on poverty and wellbeing. 
The continued uncertainty around climate pro-
jections in Mali only serves to reinforce the argument 
that effective responses, including those described in 
this chapter, must be able to accommodate a range of 
possible futures. Moreover, monitoring systems must 
be in place to track the evolving climate pressures and 
associated impacts. These must then adjust adaptation 
strategies accordingly. It is important to emphasise 
that adaptation is not a one-off activity, but dynamic 
and open-ended. The example of the difficulty of 
attributing impacts such as early childhood stunting, 
to a particular climate factor such as drought length, 
is indicative of the complexity in developing practical 
diagnostic, monitoring and measuring frameworks for 
resilience.
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CHAPTER 4  
Poverty impacts of tropical 
cyclones in the Philippines 
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4.1 Tropical cyclones and poverty
Tropical cyclones are one of the costliest types of 
climate hazard and have the potential to produce large 
numbers of casualties (see figure 8). Over the past two 
centuries, cyclones have been responsible for approx-
imately 2 million deaths (Penuel and Statler, 2011). 
The heavy rainfall, wind gusts and storm surges that 
accompany tropical cyclones can be highly destructive 
to low-lying coastal areas, causing extensive property 
damage and numerous deaths by drowning. Although 
it is not clear how patterns of cyclonic activity will alter 
under climate change, observations have demon-
strated that tropical cyclones have become more 
intense since 1982 (Kossin et al., 2013). 
On average, the Philippines experiences more than 
18 typhoons each year, making it the second most 
hazard-prone country in the world (Birkmann et al., 
2014). Increasing sea levels, combined with potential 
increases in cyclonic intensity are likely to amplify 
the impact of tropical storms to the Philippines, and 
threaten the estimated 40 million Filipinos who live in 
coastal areas. These hazards jeopardise the Philippines’ 
consistent economic growth, which has positioned the 
island nation amongst the best performing  economies 
in Asia (Government of Philippines, 2015). Even with 
rapid economic growth, the Philippines’ poverty 
headcount hovered over 25% in 2012, and the most 
vulnerable remain highly exposed to disasters. In 
Manila alone, over two thirds of poor households 
already suffer regular losses from cyclones, floods and 
storm surges – a figure that is likely to increase with 
sea level rise, maladaptive land use and uncontrolled 
expansion into exposed areas (Pillai et al., 2010).
On 8 November 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan made 
landfall in eastern and central Philippines, breaking 
records for being the strongest ever recorded storm 
and creating a trail of devastation in the path of the 
five-metre high storm (Munich Re, 2014). The ensuing 
humanitarian emergency left upwards of 7,300 people 
dead and 4.1 million people displaced after their 
homes were damaged or destroyed (GFDRR, 2014). 
Agriculture and fishing-based economies, the main 
sources of livelihood for affected populations, were 
wiped out. Health and education service infrastructure 
Summary
The Philippines experiences over 18 tropical cyclones 
each year, with nine that cross land and three that are 
potentially disastrous (Birkmann et al., 2014). Exposure 
to storm surges is expected to increase, due to rising 
sea levels and this together with potential increases 
in cyclone intensity, is likely to have a strong impact 
on poverty across the country. This will threaten the 
lives and livelihoods of the millions of Filipinos who 
live in coastal areas, and is likely to undermine recent 
development gains and economic growth. Building 
resilience to future storm surges and cyclonic activity 
requires investments in Disaster Risk Management that 
are sensitive to the needs of the poorest, particularly 
those living in informal housing in coastal cities. Along 
with this, inclusive development must support the 
capacities of coastal populations to face future risks. 
Crucial points to consider in relation to this are:
• In 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in 
the Philippines, killing 7,300 people, displacing 
4.1 million and also impacting on agriculture- and 
fishing-based economies (GFDRR, 2014).
• Although nationwide economic growth rates were 
not affected in 2014, at the local level, Haiyan led 
an additional 2.3 million people to fall below the 
poverty line (GFDRR, 2014). 
• Every level of government in the Philippines has 
its own disaster risk reduction and management 
council or committee (Fernandez et al., 2012).
• Anticipatory responses in advance of Haiyan’s 
landfall substantially reduced deaths, but also high-
lighted a number of gaps in disaster preparedness 
planning (Oxfam, 2013; Ocon & Neussner, 2015). 
• After Haiyan, new initiatives to mitigate future 
cyclone exposure included mangrove reforesta-
tion and the declaration of a no-dwell zone within 
40 metres of the coast (De Vera, 2013).
• Solutions are needed to build the adaptive capacity 
of the urban poor living in low-lying areas, and those 
whose livelihoods depend on access to the coast. 
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sustained significant damage, with over 3,000 schools 
partially or completely destroyed (World Bank, 2014). 
The scale of the damage was immense, testing the 
limits of response operations and the capacity of 
government to support communities to recover. 
Macro-level economic indicators disguise a more 
worrying story about the impact very strong cyclones 
can have on poverty at the subnational level. While the 
worst-affected areas struggled to recover their assets, 
nation-wide economic growth continued rapidly, with 
a 6.5% GDP growth rate in the last quarter of 2013, 
making the Philippines the best performing Asian 
economy after China (Lopez, 2014). Haiyan did not 
appear to affect growth rates in 2014, which remained 
strong at 6.9% (World Bank. 2015d). Meanwhile, ongo-
ing reconstruction efforts and increases in remittances 
are expected to provide a boost to overall performance 
into 2015 (Wyatt, 2014).
At a local level, however, the effect of the cyclone on 
poverty and livelihoods was immense. In the Eastern 
Visayas, where Haiyan first made landfall, over 45% of 
the population was living in poverty before the storm 
hit. Here, the city of Tacloban was destroyed, affecting 
millions of people. A post-disaster assessment by the 
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 
found the disaster pushed an additional 2.3 million 
people, nearly 500,000 households, below the national 
poverty line. In the worst-affected areas, the poverty 
rate rose to over 50%. Self-reported poverty rates one 
month after the disaster were even higher: 70% of 
victims rated themselves as poor compared to approx-
imately 50% of the rest of the country (Social Weather 
Station, 2014). This can be largely attributed to Haiyan’s 
impact on the fishing and farming industry. Nearly 
three quarters of households experienced a decline in 
their livelihood situation after the typhoon, with fishers 
and coconut farmers experiencing the most difficulty 
(Sherwood et al., 2014). The increased cost of living 
after the disaster put even more pressure on poor 
households. Over 405 of households affected lost their 
primary source of income (ILO, 2014). Economic losses 
in the wake of Haiyan were enormous for displaced 
survivors, most of whom lost productive assets, had no 
access to jobs and lost their homes (Sherwood et al., 
2014).
4.2 The ongoing challenge of building resilience
The Philippines has a long history of coping with 
disasters and the Disaster Risk Management system 
has evolved and undergone improvements after 
major events in response to public demand (Ocon and 
Neussner, 2015). In 2010, a new disaster reduction and 
management law (Republic Act 10121) was introduced, 
in which the government officially adopted communi-
ty-based DRM as a principle for dealing with disasters, 
supporting local capacity to respond to emergencies 
and decentralising DRM functions to local government 
units. Every level of government – national, regional, 
provincial, city, municipal and barangay – has its own 
disaster risk reduction and management council 
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or committee (Fernandez et al., 2012). The commu-
nity-based DRM approach has been heralded as a 
successful strategy, with local people participating in 
DRM councils for preparedness and response planning, 
and some barangay even undertaking participatory 
budgeting for DRM. On paper, the institutional 
arrangements that have been designed to manage 
risk are strongly rooted in principles of public account-
ability and equitable delivery. However, varying 
levels of capacity and corruption at different levels of 
government have compromised the effectiveness of 
the DRM system in supporting vulnerable populations 
(Diola, 2015, Thura, 2013). 
Varying levels of capacity and 
corruption at different levels of 
government have compromised the 
effectiveness of the DRM system in 
supporting vulnerable populations
Overall, the focus of DRM efforts has been on 
improving early warning systems and preparedness, 
with anticipatory actions proving to be effective for 
Typhoon Haiyan, substantially reducing loss of life. 
The municipal authority of San Francisco, which was 
directly in the path of Haiyan, evacuated an entire 
small island and managed to save its inhabitants 
(Rananda, 2014). At the national level, the President 
of the Philippines went on national television in the 
week leading up to the storm to warn the public, an 
intervention that has been credited with triggering 
mass evacuations that saved many lives.
The response to the crisis was broadly considered 
to be effective, demonstrating high levels of coping 
capacity in the Philippines, even in the face of such a 
high-intensity event. Two months after Haiyan, a poll 
of survivors in Eastern Visayas region showed that 79% 
of survivors were satisfied with the local government 
response to Haiyan and 77% were satisfied with the 
national government’s response (Social Weather 
Station, 2014). The international community also 
played a large role in emergency response – affected 
communities were inundated with cash transfers 
designed to expedite recovery for households that had 
lost their possessions in the disaster. Cash transfers 
constituted approximately 40% of all response spend-
ing. About three quarters of transfers were conditional 
or provided through cash-for-work programmes, 
mainly supporting livelihood rehabilitation for the 
poorest families. Favouring cash over physical goods 
allowed households to make decisions suited to 
their own recovery. These cash transfers and private 
remittances lessened the typhoon’s impacts on jobs 
and output in the absence of a comprehensive social 
safety net for survivors. 
Despite these significant achievements, Haiyan 
highlighted a number of gaps in disaster preparedness 
planning. Many residents in affected areas did not 
understand the term ‘storm surge’ used in the early 
warnings. According to interviews with survivors, the 
terminology was not associated with the tsunami-like 
effects that followed (Libessart, 2013). This lack of 
comprehension had serious consequences. According 
to a Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ) study, an estimated 94% of casualties in the three 
most heavily affected cities were due to the storm 
surge (GIZ, 2013). Furthermore, some evacuation 
centres were badly located for a storm surge of Haiyan’s 
magnitude. In Tacloban, thousands of people stayed in 
an indoor stadium designated as an evacuation centre. 
Though the roof stayed on, a 6-metre surge of water 
flooded the structure and killed the people sheltering 
inside. This indicates clear lessons for improving disas-
ter preparedness, in particular, the importance of using 
risk assessments in preparedness planning. Extreme 
events of this scale and intensity will happen again 
and lessons must be learned each time about how to 
improve mechanisms for raising awareness, alerting 
populations and managing evacuations and shelters. 
However, these efforts will not save all human life and 
property, as these apparently rare events become more 
frequent and human exposure to them continues to 
rise (Mendelsohn et al., 2012). Building resilience to 
cyclones, storm surge and flooding in the Philippines 
will need to tackle the root causes of increasing expo-
sure and vulnerability, better accommodate extremes 
and focus attention on the most vulnerable groups.
Overall, efforts to build long term adaptive capacity 
are less prominent in local planning than preparedness 
and response measures. Early warning systems and 
evacuation plans are important for reducing mortality 
but do not constitute a holistic DRM strategy (Wilkinson 
et al., 2014) and notwithstanding these efforts to 
prepare, response and recovery after a disaster still 
constitutes the majority of the Philippines’ DRM 
budget. At the start of 2013, 54% of public DRM funds 
had already been allocated to response and recovery. 
Recognising the need for more proactive measures to 
reduce climate risks, the government allocated PHP 
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13.7 billion ($293 million) in 2014 to a National Disaster 
Risk Reduction and Management Fund, replacing the 
Calamity Fund which had about half the budget and 
was focused on post-disaster activities (McElroy, 2013).
In the Philippines, exposure to cyclones is driven by 
a number of factors, including the following:
• Rapid urbanisation results in the urban poor living 
in hazardous places where land is cheaper, such as 
flood plains or unstable slopes. Houses are generally 
constructed with poor-quality materials and are 
both uninsured and untitled. The urban poor tend 
to work in the informal sector and have few assets 
to help them absorb the impacts of disasters (World 
Bank, 2010). This result could be seen after Haiyan, 
as the poorest lacked alternative sources of income 
when their livelihoods were affected.
• Mangrove deforestation across the Philippines 
has increased exposure to storm surge. In the 
worst-affected areas of Eastern Visayas, mangroves 
had been cleared out, removing a natural 
barrier and leaving the storm surge to sweep over 
low-lying areas unobstructed. The Secretary for the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
(DENR) estimated that up to 80% of the storm 
surge’s strength would have been dissipated had 
mangrove forests been healthy (DZRB News, 2013). 
Lessons from Haiyan have had some influence 
on longer-term planning: the Government of the 
Philippines has recognised the role mangroves play as 
a natural defence and the DENR has pledged PHP 347 
million ($7.4 million) to develop mangrove forests in 
the Eastern Visayas (DZRB News, 2013). Yet despite the 
magnitude of the impact on poverty levels, surprisingly 
little attention is being paid to strengthening the adap-
tive capacity of at-risk communities, including through 
the diversification of incomes away from activities 
highly sensitive to high winds and flooding. A small 
number of NGOs have stepped in with programmes to 
help communities consider options for diversification, 
such as through community-based sustainable 
tourism. However many more NGO cash for work 
programmes aim to support and rehabilitate – rather 
than diversify – affected livelihoods (Brown, 2015).
In 2013 the Government of the Philippines 
declared a no-dwell zone within 40 m of the coast in 
order to reduce exposure to similar climate extremes 
in the future. The law prohibits construction in an 
effort to reduce the vulnerability of coastal dwelling 
populations to future storm surges (De Vera, 2013). 
Many poorer fishers have not adhered to the law, as 
it has a disproportionate impact on their livelihoods 
(Eadie, 2015). Among those Visayan householders who 
were affected by Typhoon Haiyan, 91% reported that 
they would rebuild their homes in the original location; 
without other land available, many survivors felt they 
had no choice but to re-expose themselves to high 
risks. 
Municipal planning in Tacloban has attempted to 
provide alternatives for poor people to facilitate better 
adaptation to future climate risks. City-wide plans for 
disaster-resilient reconstruction has included the crea-
tion of about 1,000 new homes in safer settlement sites 
north of the city, as well as retrofitting important social 
and physical infrastructure along the coast (Tacloban 
Recovery and Sustainable Development Group, 2014). 
Shifting land use away from lowland development is 
clearly important for reducing exposure and sensitivity 
to future typhoons, but early surveys conducted 
one month after Haiyan have already shown that 
poor people are willing to assume high risks in their 
land choices in order to live near the source of their 
livelihoods. Reducing exposure must be balanced with 
the needs of fishers and agriculturalists to practice their 
occupation and make a living. Applying the lessons 
of Haiyan to future disasters across the Philippines 
means an increased focus on improving anticipatory 
capacity of the poorest, ensuring they can adapt to 
future climate extremes without compromising their 
livelihoods. 
4.3 Looking ahead: Climate change impacts on 
major cities
Typhoon Haiyan was a wake-up call for the 
Government of the Philippines. The high death toll and 
widespread destruction has highlighted the need to 
improve preparedness and climateproof infrastructure, 
particularly for the poorest who live in areas with high 
hazard risk. Commitments to relocate human settle-
ment 40 metres away from the coast, rehabilitate man-
groves and retrofit infrastructure are only the first steps 
to protect the Philippines from future disaster impacts. 
As Tacloban slowly recovers, discussions about Haiyan’s 
impacts have shifted to how larger cities – including 
Manila – would cope with an event of similar magni-
tude (Eadie, 2015). Manila’s typhoon risk is ranked as 
‘high’ by the Manila Observatory and the DENR, which 
is worrying for the city that functions as the engine 
of the Filipino economy (Center for Environmental 
Geomatics, 2005). A disaster in the Manila Bay could 
have profound impacts on national growth and 
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poverty; over 60% of the country’s economic growth 
occurs in the Filipino capital, but it is also home to 
some of the country’s most profound poverty and 
inequality (USAID, 2014). With its large concentration 
of slums, heavy traffic, dense population and low-lying 
geography, Manila is particularly vulnerable to floods 
and cyclones and any rise in sea level will intensify their 
impact. However, it is important to consider local con-
figurations of exposure (including topography, along 
with the location and quality of housing and critical 
infrastructure) and poverty, as these will determine the 
impacts of future storm surge and flooding more than 
the characteristics of the storm itself.
Metro Manila has a population of over 20 million, 
making it nearly 100 times bigger than Tacloban 
(World Bank, 2010). The 16 cities that comprise Metro 
Manila are highly vulnerable to disasters due to their 
lack of transportation infrastructure, percentage of 
unemployed and uninsured residents, and intensity 
of land use (Shaw et al., 2010). A typhoon similar to 
Haiyan could have catastrophic consequences in the 
capital, particularly for dispossessed populations 
living in slums where population density is as high 
as 75,000–80,000 people per square mile (Roy, 2014). 
Indeed, poverty maps indicate similar concentrations 
of poor households in Manila and Eastern Visayas 
– where Haiyan first made landfall – in terms of the 
proportion of households in the poorest quintile 
(see figure 9). Furthermore, most of Manila’s poor 
families live in areas facing Manila Bay. Recent statistics 
estimate that 15% of households in the metropolitan 
area live in informal housing, a figure that reaches 
nearly 40% in some of the poorest sub-cities within 
Metro Manila (ICF International, 2014) (see figure 10). 
The proliferation of informal settlements has modified 
natural flood drainage channels by increasing built 
surfaces and filling channels with debris, making these 
already precarious settlements even more vulnerable 
to heavy rainfall. These informal settlements have 
become a persistent phenomenon in many parts of 
Metro Manila, moving further into hazard-prone areas 
and entrenching patterns of exposure to cyclones, 
storm surge and flooding as in-migration intensifies. 
Informal settlements can be found all over Metro 
Manila, although those that are among the most 
exposed to flooding and storms are also in municipalities 
with high percentage of family incomes below the 
national poverty threshold (a high poverty gap) (see 
figure 10). For example, Malabon City, situated just north 
of the City of Manila, has a high poverty incidence and 
a large poverty gap, and is also among the areas most 
vulnerable to sea level rise, flooding and typhoons. It is 
known as Little Venice for the year-round flood along its 
river bank. Despite Malabon’s gradual sinking, informal 
settlements along the river bank continue proliferating, 
housing those who want to live in Manila but are unable 
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Figure 10. The incidence of poverty and poverty gap in 
Metro Manila
The share of households in the poorest quintile in the Philippines. 
Metro Manila, located in the northwest of the country, has a similar 
poverty profile to the Eastern Visayas, where Haiyan first made landfall. 
Source: Author calculation based on data from Demographic 
Health Survey (2013)
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to afford property in safer parts of the city. For families 
who live along the river, regular downpours and 
typhoons force them to evacuate to designated centres 
until the water recedes. Directly adjacent to Malabon is 
Navotas City, which has one of the highest incidences of 
informal settlements in Metro Manila, with nearly 40% 
of households living in informal settlements in 2002. 
It also has one of the highest levels of poverty. This is 
unsurprising because informal settlements arise partly 
due to a lack of affordable accommodation available on 
the formal market and in safer locations. Navotas City is 
situated directly on the bay, making it highly exposed to 
storm surges. This combination of exposure, poverty and 
informal housing makes Navotas city extremely vulner-
able to cyclones. This risk is real: over 15% of typhoons 
crossing the Philippines pass by Manila and its vicinity 
(World Bank, 2010).
Rising sea levels pose a serious 
threat to Metro Manila, although there 
is considerable uncertainty regarding 
the specific level of change
Storm surge, rather than storm intensity, was 
responsible for most of the Haiyan casualties in 
Tacloban. Models of storm surge using the Regional 
Ocean Modeling System (ROMS) show that if a 
category 3 typhoon were to pass over Manila on a track 
similar to Typhoon Angela in 1995, Manila City would 
experience approximately 1 metre of storm surge from 
Manila Bay (Drews and Han, 2009). This would affect 
Navotas and Malabon, and huge agglomerations of 
informal settlements would be severely damaged 
(Nakamura, 2009; Drews and Han, 2009). This is cor-
roborated by a study of storm surge sensitivity, which 
ranks Manila first of 25 cities in terms of population 
that will be affected by storm surge in the future 
(Dasgupta et al., 2009). Rising sea levels pose a serious 
threat to Metro Manila, although there is considerable 
uncertainty – particularly at the regional level – regard-
ing the specific level of change. At the global scale, 
sea levels are projected to increase by between 57 and 
110 cm by the end of the 21st century (Jevrejeva et al., 
2014). As an indication of the changing exposure to 
storm surge, figure 11 highlights densely populated 
areas (over 1000 people per kilometre2) that are less 
than both 10 and 12 metres above mean sea level. 
The 10-metre threshold shows populations sensitive 
to a storm surge of between 7 and 8 metres (although 
precise impact depends on local characteristics and 
topography) (Lin and Emanuel, 2015). The 12-metre 
threshold illustrates areas that will be potentially at 
risk as sea levels rise over the coming years. Over 
Metro Manila, a 2 metre sea level rise would mean a 
large expansion of the potentially affected area. At 
the national scale, given the large number of people 
living in areas at low elevation, this would increase the 
proportion of the population potentially exposed from 
approximately 17% to 22%.3
Figure 11. Densely populated areas (>1000 people per 
km2) less than 12 and 10 metres above mean sea level 
respectively for the northern Philippines
Populated area (>12m elevation)
Populated area (<10m elevation)
Populated area (10–12m elevation)
Source: Fischer et al. (2008), FGGD (2015)
3. Calculated from Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimation on population density for 2015 and FAO elevation datasets. Difference 
in total population living 0–10 m above sea level and population living 0-12 m above sea level. Based on low resolution data and estimation of 
population density.
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The low-lying geography of Manila’s littoral, along 
with its most densely populated areas being in loca-
tions of less than 10 metres above sea level, means sea 
level rise will undoubtedly have serious consequences 
for its inhabitants. An Asian Development Bank study 
has ranked the Philippines fifth in terms of numbers of 
individuals potentially affected by sea level rise (ADB, 
2012). Worse yet, groundwater pumping in some parts 
of Manila, such as Navotas, is causing land to sink. This 
is producing tides that reach further inland and caus-
ing floods that rise faster, which can be devastating 
for houses situated around drainage pathways (World 
Bank, 2010). Exposure to storm surge and flooding is 
not simply a matter of elevation; local characteristics in 
these slums define how heavily they will be affected. 
The Philippines already receives more than its 
fair share of disasters but, with rising sea levels and 
potential increases in tropical cyclone intensity, 
development gains will be further jeopardised without 
policies to protect the most vulnerable. The 40 m 
no-dwell zone declared after Haiyan is an illustration of 
how this might be enacted. However, experience also 
shows that for such a measure to work, simultaneous 
livelihood support for populations that depend on 
access to the coast will be required. 
Strengthening of local DRM institutions combined 
with considerable investments in early warning 
systems and preparedness for cyclones, has substan-
tially increased the capacity of communities in the 
Philippines to anticipate ‘normal’ climate extremes and 
cope with these shocks. However, extreme events like 
Haiyan severely test local coping capacities and these 
types of events look set to become more frequent. 
In the Philippines, the whole population lives within 
100 kilometres of the coast and many major cities – 
including four with a population of over a million – are 
situated in coastal areas. Solutions are needed to 
strengthen the adaptive capacity of those that are 
most vulnerable. Uncertainty is the ‘new normal’, and 
building resilience to future storm surge and cyclonic 
activity requires investments in DRM that are sensitive 
to the needs of the poorest people, particularly those 
living in informal housing in coastal cities. Cyclones are 
a geographic reality, but disasters can be avoided. In 
the Philippines, inclusive development must support 
the capacities of coastal populations to face future 
risks. 
CHAPTER 5  
Poverty impacts of heatwaves 
in India
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5.1 The heat threat
Around the world, heat extremes and heatwaves are 
on the rise (Smith et al., 2013; Perkins et al., 2012; 
Alexander et al., 2006). The number of extreme hot 
days has been steadily increasing across most of the 
world in recent decades, with 2014 now currently 
the hottest year on record (Seneviratne et al., 2014; 
Trenberth, 2015). This trend looks set to continue, with 
climate model projections suggesting extreme heat 
increases are likely across most of the planet in the 
years to come (Sillmann et al., 2013). 
Heatwaves are dangerous because of the body’s 
sensitivity to temperature. The body needs to maintain 
a core temperature of approximately 37°C in order to 
function, so mortality and impacts on health are the 
most significant heat-related risks; sustained exposure 
to heat can overwhelm the body’s mechanisms to 
regulate this core temperature. As perspiration is the 
primary cooling mechanism, early signs of heat stress 
include heavy sweating, along with rapid breathing 
and a fast, weak pulse. If the body loses the ability to 
perspire or the effectiveness of perspiration is limited 
by high humidity, heat stress can quickly lead to heat 
exhaustion, severe dehydration and heat stroke, a 
form of hyperthermia. Symptoms vary, but can include 
headaches, dry skin, vomiting, dizziness and low blood 
pressure. These heat impacts become deadly when the 
body’s core temperature rises too high and the heart 
is no longer able to maintain adequate circulation, 
leading to unconsciousness and ultimately organ 
failure (Bouchama and Knochel, 2002). 
To a large extent, heat-related mortality and illness 
are preventable and can be treated through cooling 
and rehydration. However, there is a widespread lack 
of awareness of the symptoms of heat stress and the 
measures that can be taken to reduce risks. There are 
cases reported in the media, for example, of families 
and health workers mistaking the symptoms of heat 
stroke for stomach problems (Sriram, 2015). As a 
result, heatwave fatalities tend to be underreported, 
particularly in developing countries (Thompson, 2015), 
meaning data on heat-related illness is especially 
limited.
While the most significant threat from extreme 
heat is to human health, this can also have knock-on 
effects on the local and national economy. Heat stress 
Summary
Heatwaves are often overlooked as disaster events, 
but they can be dangerous, even deadly. There is a 
widespread lack of awareness of the symptoms of heat 
stress, as well as the measures that can be taken to 
reduce risks. In India, heatwaves are common throughout 
the pre-monsoon hot season, particularly in the northern 
states that are home to many of the country’s poorest 
people. Climate models suggest there will be an increase 
in the number of heatwave days across much more 
of Northern and Central India in the future. Heatwaves 
in May 2015 affected a large part of the country and 
claimed the lives of more than 2,300 people, with 
temperatures 5.5°C above average for nearly two weeks.
• The impacts of heatwaves are not felt equally 
across the population. In India, the worst affected 
are people who are poor, elderly or homeless, along 
with residents of urban slums and those who work 
outdoors, such as construction workers, rickshaw 
pullers or street cleaners.
• Some Indian authorities are beginning to recognise 
and address the impacts of heatwaves. Odisha 
state, for example, developed a heat plan to build 
anticipatory capacity; more recently Ahmedabad 
city has established a Heat Action Plan with a 
comprehensive strategy for reducing the impacts of 
extreme heat.
• Climate projections suggest increased frequen-
cy and intensity of heatwave days by the middle of 
the century. At the same time, numbers of Indians 
living in cities and that are vulnerable to heat 
stress is increasing.
• It is unclear to what extent those that are most 
vulnerable are benefitting from current efforts to 
build resilience.
• An important factor hindering progress is the na-
tional government’s failure to recognise heatwaves 
as disaster events. Officially listing heatwaves as 
disasters would be a welcome first step in build-
ing resilience.
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is known to reduce productivity when places of work 
are forced to temporarily close or when people are too 
unwell or tired to work (Zander et al., 2015). Heatwaves 
can also have direct impacts on temperature-sensitive 
sectors, such as livestock and agriculture. During a 
recent heatwave in India, 17 million chickens died 
within a month, which not only had implications for 
the poultry sector and corn producers, but also caused 
the cost of chicken to jump by 35% (Jadhav, 2015). 
Evidence of the broader impacts of heatwaves on 
development is relatively limited, compared to other 
hazards, but examples are emerging from the region. 
In Pakistan, for instance, heat stress has been shown 
to drive rural-urban migration, as heat-related crop 
damage reduces farmers’ incomes (Mueller et al., 2014). 
Heat events appear to be a bigger driver of migration 
than floods in Pakistan, with farmers – especially men 
who do not own the land they are farming – moving to 
urban centres in search of economic stability (Mueller 
et al., 2014). It seems likely that a similar story plays out 
in heat-affected parts of rural India.
5.2 Heatwaves in India
In India, heatwaves are common throughout the 
pre-monsoon hot season, from late May and into June; in 
rare cases these extend into July, particularly in the north 
west (De et al., 2005). In recent decades, significant heat-
wave events have occurred in 1995, 1998, 2002, 2003, 
2010, 2011, 2013 and, most recently, in May 2015 (Jha et 
al., 2015). However, these events are not spread equally 
either across the country or year-on-year: some hot 
seasons are notably warmer than others and the north of 
the country tends to suffer more intense, longer-lasting 
and regular heatwaves than the south (De et al., 2005). 
As shown in figure 13 the hottest temperatures tend to 
occur along the border with Pakistan, but long-lasting 
heatwaves are experienced across much of northern 
India (Murari et al., 2015). Historically, the northern Indian 
states of Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, 
Rajasthan, Bihar and Odisha (formerly Orissa) record the 
highest numbers of heatwaves and heat-related deaths 
(De and Sinha Ray, 2000). These northern states are also 
home to many of India’s poorest people and are also sites 
of some of the country’s most rapid population growth. 
5.2.1 India heatwave 1998 
The heatwave of 1998 was the deadliest event of its 
kind in India’s recorded history, claiming the lives 
of 2,541 people, with the east coast state of Odisha 
being the worst hit. Temperatures peaked at 48.9°C in 
Titilagarh in Western Odisha, while towards the more 
humid eastern coast, the state capital Bhubaneswar 
experienced highs of 45.9°C (The Hindu, 2000). Odisha 
has a long history of cyclones, flooding and drought, 
but a heatwave of such severity was unprecedented 
and took the public and the authorities by surprise 
(SANDEE, 2012), leading to 2,042 people losing their 
lives. It is thought that lack of preparedness prior to 
this event was largely due to low levels of awareness of 
the risks associated with heatwaves or the options for 
mitigating these impacts (Das and Smith, 2012). 
5.2.2 India heatwave 2015 
The heatwave of 2015 is significant as India’s second 
deadliest heat event. Estimates indicate that the hot 
weather claimed the lives of more than 2,300 people 
across the country in May 2015 (Jha et al., 2015). A very 
rapid rise to heatwave temperatures likely played a role 
in the sale of the impact. 
Heatwave conditions affected a large part of India, 
with temperatures 5.5°C above average for nearly two 
weeks (Samenow, 2015). Lives were lost in Odisha, Uttar 
Pradesh, Delhi and other North Indian states and cities, 
as daytime temperatures regularly exceeded 40°C (see 
Figure 12). In some coastal areas the combination of high 
temperatures and high humidity added to the heat risk 
(Thompson, 2015). However, the impacts were felt most 
in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, further south than for 
past events, claiming the lives of 1,636 and 561 people 
respectively in these two states (Tuff, 2015). Temperatures 
here rapidly soared to the high forties during the day and 
remained at around 30°C overnight; such persistently 
high temperatures can have more of an impact on 
residents because of the lack of relief (Thompson, 2015). 
India was not the only South Asian country affected by 
heatwaves in 2015; in June, Karachi and adjoining areas 
of Sindh in neighbouring Pakistan also recorded upward 
of 2,000 heat-related deaths (Haider and Ani, 2015).
Throughout the 21st century temperatures are 
projected to significantly increase across the region 
(IPCC, 2014a). For the mid-21st century period, under 
a “business as usual” greenhouse gas scenario, there is 
a clear signal from climate models for slight increases 
in the intensity of heatwaves, but large increases in 
the number of “heatwave” days (Figure 13). A relatively 
small increase in average temperatures can result in 
a large increase in time above certain thresholds. For 
example, initial analysis of climate models suggest 
pre-monsoon season heatwave conditions could 
become almost twice as frequent in the North West 
regions of India, and almost three times as frequent 
in the central regions by the 2050s. Individual models 
(Murari et al., 2015) also project increases in both the 
intensity and frequency of heatwave conditions in the 
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southern regions, which are historically less prone to 
these events. The recent 2015 heat event in Andhra 
Pradesh and Telangana may therefore be a sign of 
things to come for historically less affected southern 
India.
5.3 Distributional impacts of heatwaves
The impacts of heatwaves are not felt equally across 
the population and factors that increase vulnerability 
to extreme heat include: 
• old age and underlying health conditions such as 
cardiovascular diseases, psychiatric and pulmonary 
illness 
• low mobility and confinement to a bed
• social isolation 
• physical exertion in hot conditions 
• poor quality housing 
• living in an area with high population density 
• limited vegetation and open space 
• restricted access to clean water and electricity 
(Milan and Creutzig, 2015). 
Figure 12. Daytime maximum temperature during the 
week May 24–30, 2015
Figure 13. Average number of pre-monsoon “heat wave days”, 1981–2010 (left) and change by the mid-21st century 
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Due to the urban heat island effect, risks are often 
highest in urban areas and many of the factors above 
are closely linked to poverty. In addition to the higher 
temperatures often experienced in urban areas, heat 
stress and associated health impacts can also be 
compounded by poor air quality, which typically occurs 
under the same weather conditions that produce 
extreme urban heat (Wilby, 2008).
The urban population in India has been growing 
steadily and UN projections have estimated this will 
rise from 31% in 2011 to approximately 40% in 2030 
adding another 225 million people to urban areas, 
more than the population of Japan and Germany 
combined. Those moving from rural to urban areas are 
particularly vulnerable to heatwaves because they are 
generally poor. Most will move to densely populated 
areas, and have poor quality housing with restricted 
access to clean water and electricity. They will also 
be less connected to support networks and services 
than established city dwellers. In addition, the UK 
Government Foresight Report found that when peo-
ple’s incomes are threatened by environmental change 
they migrate in ‘illegal, irregular, unsafe, exploited or 
unplanned ways’. As a result, they are also more likely 
to find themselves migrating to areas of high environ-
mental risk, such as low-lying ureas in mega-deltas or 
slums in water- 
insecure, expanding cities (Government Office for 
Science, 2011: 104).
Across India, the worst affected by heatwaves are 
poor, homeless or elderly people, along with residents 
of urban slums and those who work outdoors, such 
as construction workers, rickshaw pullers or street 
cleaners. These groups endure greater exposure to the 
heat and tend to have less access to air conditioning, 
refrigeration, clean drinking water, healthcare or other 
resources that mitigate the effects of heat (Thompson, 
2015). Many of India’s poorest are daily wage earners, 
which adds to their vulnerability, because they cannot 
stop working when temperatures creep up to danger-
ous levels; conversely, people who are unable to work 
due to heat-related illness lose vital income. 
Epidemiological studies suggest that risks for men 
and women do not differ significantly (Tan, 2008). 
However, evidence from Pakistan indicates differences 
in the causes of men and women’s vulnerability. 
Women often face continuous exposure to the heat in 
poorly ventilated homes and, unlike men, are unable 
to sleep outside on roofs to escape high night-time 
temperatures, while men working in construction or 
other outdoor labour face greater exposure to peak 
daytime temperatures (Khan et al., 2014). Traditional 
gender roles in India may play a role in shaping 
these vulnerabilities.
5.4 Building resilience to heatwaves
The imagery of heat stress is less powerful when 
compared to the crashing waters of a flood or the 
lashing winds of a cyclone, with the visible devastation 
such events leave behind. With heatwaves, impacts are 
more difficult to visualise and this goes some way to 
explaining the limited attention given in the media and 
lesser efforts to build resilience to extreme heat.
In India, efforts to tackle extreme heat have been 
led from the subnational level, rather than by central 
authorities. Odisha was the first state in India to recog-
nise and address the impacts of heatwaves following 
the devastating heatwave of 1998 and cyclone of 
1999. The state established the Odisha State Disaster 
Management Authority in 2000 and a heat plan was 
developed in 2002 as part of the Disaster Management 
Plan (Jha et al., 2015). The state government worked 
closely with lower levels of government to implement 
the plan and heatwave risks have continued to 
feature prominently in Odisha’s subsequent Disaster 
Management Plans. The heat plan focuses on building 
anticipatory capacity: it is centred around an early 
warning system and heat awareness campaign, 
focusing on bringing about behavioural changes that 
reduce vulnerability. Heatwave alerts from the Indian 
Meteorological Department are monitored during the 
pre-monsoon summer months and tips for how to 
cope with heatwaves are shared through the media, 
local volunteers and health workers, amongst others 
(SANDEE, 2012). Health services and other relevant 
departments are required to be prepared to enact 
emergency measures (OSDMA, 2013). These include 
arrangements for emergency drinking water supply; 
rescheduling school days and working hours, especially 
for those employed in outdoor, physical labour; and 
veterinary measures to protect livestock (OSDMA, 
2013).
Taking this effort a step further, the city of 
Ahmedabad in the north western state of Gujarat has 
also begun to tackle heat impacts. As in Odisha, action 
in Ahmedabad was prompted by a severe heatwave. 
Research indicates that a major heat event in 2010 
killed an estimated 1,344 people, many more than the 
50 deaths reported by city officials at the time (Azhar et 
al., 2014) or the 250 heatwave deaths recorded for India 
as a whole that year (Guha-Sapir et al., n.d.). This served 
as a wake-up call for local authorities and prompted 
coordinated action to ensure the city and its residents 
were better prepared for the next such event. From 
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2012, city authorities worked with partners to establish 
a Heat Action Plan. Launched in 2013, it is the first of its 
kind in South Asia. 
The Heat Action Plan sets out a comprehensive 
strategy for combatting extreme heat in the city of 
Ahmedabad, including short- and long-term actions to 
minimise heat-related health risks, along with prioritis-
ing actions that can be implemented at low cost with 
maximum impact (CDKN, 2014). As with the Odisha case, 
actions to raise awareness and build anticipatory capac-
ity form major components of the plan. This includes a 
strong emphasis on building institutional capacity to 
manage and deal with the impact of heat extremes. The 
strategy requires, for example, the training of healthcare 
workers and others employed in vulnerable sectors, 
such as construction, to recognise and treat heat stress. 
City-level, interagency coordination to manage heat 
risks and deliver an emergency response effort has also 
been established. Measures to reduce the heat threat 
from the built environment under hot conditions have 
also been taken, such as moving the hospital’s maternity 
ward away from the top and hottest floor, painting the 
hospital roof white, opening ‘cooling spaces’ in temples 
and shopping malls, and keeping parks open at night 
to offer some relief from the heat. India is no stranger to 
heat and many of these measures will have benefits for 
vulnerable populations even outside heatwave periods.
In Delhi, the authorities responded to 
the heatwave in 2015 by halving the 
price of electricity and increasing the 
availability of free water in an effort 
help residents to cope with the heat
Ahmedabad is the only city in India to have enacted 
such a comprehensive plan to protect its residents 
against the effects of heatwaves. However, this 
forward-looking example has prompted other cities and 
states to think about taking heat risks more seriously. 
The city of Nagpur in the state of Maharashtra, for 
example, is reportedly devising its own plan, learning 
from experience in Ahmedabad (Jha et al., 2015). In the 
city of Surat in the state of Gujarat, some measures to 
reduce heat risks such as cool roofs are being rolled out, 
although no formal action plan has yet been developed 
(Jha et al., 2015). In Delhi, the authorities responded to 
the heatwave in 2015 by halving the price of electricity 
and increasing the availability of free water in an effort 
help residents to cope with the heat, although demand 
for electricity soon outstripped supply resulting in 
widespread power cuts (Roy, 2015). 
5.4.1 Are these efforts working?
Evaluating the impact of these efforts is fraught with 
challenges. Heatwaves are sporadic by nature and 
differ in their severity and length, making it difficult to 
compare their impacts even if they occur in the same 
year (Indian Institute of Public health, 2014). Equally, 
as heat-related health issues are often misdiagnosed, 
records of heat-related illness and mortality are 
inconsistent (Indian Institute of Public health, 2014). 
International precedents to guide impact assessment 
are rare.
Although the evidence is still patchy, there are signs 
that efforts to strengthen the anticipatory capacity of 
local systems have helped to reduce the impacts of 
extreme heat. In Odisha, measures implemented after 
the 1998 heatwave seem to have led to a decrease in 
heat-related mortality. Heatwave deaths in this state 
have only once exceeded 100 per year since 1998, when 
an extreme 2005 heatwave, with temperatures 10°C 
above normal, led to 236 deaths (SANDEE, 2012). In 
Ahmedabad, an evaluation of the first two years of the 
Heat Action Plan points to a decrease in excess heat-re-
lated mortality of 24% in the hottest months of 2013 
and 2014, although the heat seasons in both these years 
were less severe than in 2010 (Indian Institute of Public 
health, 2014). However, even in the relatively well-doc-
umented Odisha case, a lack of data means tracking 
progress on reducing impacts other than mortality 
– such as reduced heat-related hospitalisations, or work-
time loss – is challenging (SANDEE, 2012). In addition, 
it is not clear if these measures are reaching the most 
vulnerable. Many workers on daily wages are unable to 
follow advice to change their working hours or stay in 
the shade and household incomes often drop due to 
decreases in productivity, just at the time when personal 
spending on healthcare and recommended foods, such 
as fruit, is needed. A third of India’s population does 
not have access to electricity, meaning many of Delhi’s 
residents, for example, have been unable to benefit from 
the cheaper price of air conditioning provided by the 
city’s 2015 electricity price cuts (Roy, 2015). However, 
measures such as the provision of free water and cooling 
spaces are designed specifically for vulnerable groups, 
and the effectiveness of these needs to be evaluated.
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5.5 The way forward: mobilising action
To date, action to increase resilience to heatwaves in 
India has taken place at the subnational level and only 
in cities and states that have recently suffered human 
losses. India’s federal structure and various acts of 
political, administrative and fiscal devolution mean 
much of the responsibility for managing disaster risk 
lies at the subnational level. While actions described in 
this report are positive, efforts to tackle heat risks are 
currently piecemeal, with most Indian cities and states 
ill-prepared to cope with heatwaves (Gupta, 2015). 
Inconsistency at the subnational level leaves vulnera-
ble groups in most Indian states at unnecessary risk.
This inconsistency also plays out at the global 
scale. A handful of countries such as France and the 
UK have national-level heatwave plans, but elsewhere 
such systems are uncommon (DAWN, 2015). The World 
Meteorological Organization and the World Health 
Organization have recognised that heatwaves are a 
dangerous climate extreme not receiving enough 
attention and, in July 2015, released joint guidance on 
heat-health warning systems to address the risks posed 
by them (WMO and WHO, 2015). 
In India, one important factor hindering progress is 
national-level authorities’ lack of recognition of heat-
waves as disaster events (Gupta, 2015). Unlike cyclones, 
droughts, earthquakes, fires, floods, cold waves and 
hailstorms, heatwaves do not qualify as disasters under 
India’s Calamity Relief Fund and National Calamity 
Contingency Fund (India Disaster Knowledge Network, 
2009), despite requests for their inclusion by the 
Odisha State government and the National Disaster 
Management Authority (OSDMA, 2013). This sends a 
counter-productive message to state governments 
regarding the need to tackle heat risks. In addition, it 
carries financial implications; subnational authorities 
are unable to access these funds for heat-risk reduction 
efforts or to provide financial relief for bereaved 
families  (OSDMA, 2013).
A step forward in recognising the threat from 
heat at the national level may soon come as part 
of India’s strategy for adapting to climate change. 
India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDC), submitted to the UNFCCC ahead of the 2015 
Conference of the Parties (COP21), acknowledges 
increased frequency of heatwaves alongside other 
health risks associated with climate change and 
weather-related disasters. The country is now formu-
lating a ‘Health Mission’ as part of the National Action 
Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), which will analyse 
epidemiological data, identify vulnerable populations 
and regions, and build knowledge, expertise and 
awareness (UNFCC, 2015). The INDC also acknowledges 
the important link between adaptation and disaster 
risk reduction. However, while strengthening the 
connection between policy and planning across these 
areas would be beneficial, no roadmap for achieving 
this has been laid out.
India’s urban centres and urban slums are rapidly 
expanding and climate change is driving temperature 
increases across much of the country. Heat risks are 
therefore on the rise in India, both in areas already 
prone to heatwaves and in the historically less-affected 
south. The intensity of hot seasons in specific years to 
come, along with the locations to experience the most 
intense and long-lasting heatwaves in any given year, 
cannot be predicted any earlier than seasonal weather 
forecasts allow. Therefore, it is imperative that efforts 
to build resilience to extreme heat, alongside other 
hazards, are systematically made across the country, 
targeting the most vulnerable. 
An official listing of heatwaves as disasters by 
the national level authorities would be a welcome 
first step in realising heatwave resilience. This would 
help provide subnational authorities and relevant 
national agencies, such as the Indian Meteorological 
Department, with a mandate and resource to take 
appropriate action, according to their respective 
responsibilities and budgets (Johari, 2015). As urban 
areas expand, there is an opportunity to embed 
resilience to heatwaves, through urban planning and 
building design; a supportive policy environment 
would help ensure this opportunity becomes reality. 
Given experience in Ahmedabad and elsewhere, 
there are significant opportunities for horizontal 
lesson-learning on effective strategies for tackling 
extreme heat in the Indian context, alongside other 
urban threats. By following Ahmedabad’s example, and 
with support from the national-level systems, cities and 
states across India could make significant headway in 
enhancing resilience to extreme heat.
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CHAPTER 6  
Resilience solutions for an  
uncertain future 
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6.1 Principles for building resilience in the face 
of uncertainty
Climate resilience has multiple meanings, most of 
which draw heavily on ecology and refer to the ability 
of systems to function in the face of disturbances 
(Holling, 1973). DFID defines resilience as the ‘ability to 
anticipate, avoid, plan for, cope with, recover from and 
adapt to (climate-related) shocks and stresses’ (DFID, 
2014). For the UN Secretariat for Disaster Reduction, 
resilience is thought of as ‘the capacity of a system, 
community or society potentially exposed to hazards 
to adapt, by resisting or changing, in order to reach 
and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and 
structure’ (UNISDR, 2009). 
When translating definitions into practical action, 
they all have in common a sense that processes will 
need to incorporate learning from experience in order 
to be effective. Resilience building will also necessitate 
testing and adopting different and innovative ways of 
working, with a fundamental shift in the scope, cover-
age, intensity and combination of approaches possibly 
required. This may involve both the generation of 
new knowledge and greater recognition of the social, 
political and economic realities that shape different 
groups’ vulnerabilities to persistent poverty and 
climate change. 
6.1.1 Building adaptive, anticipatory and absorptive 
capacity – the 3 As
Tackling the combined challenges of poverty eradi-
cation and climate change requires action to increase 
the resilience of communities and societies most 
vulnerable to increasing climate risks, by strengthening 
their capacity to anticipate, absorb and adapt (Bahadur 
et al., 2015;). These three capacities are considered 
integral to development and necessary to avoid 
climate risk trajectories severely undermining efforts to 
reduce poverty. As Bahadur et al. (2015) describe: 
Adaptive capacity is the ability of a social system to 
adapt to multiple, long-term and future climate change 
risks, and also learn and adjust after a disaster. An 
example of adaptive capacity is the ability of farmers 
to diversify their risk profiles by deciding to pursue 
non-agricultural livelihood activities in sectors that 
Summary
This chapter discusses principles, and planning and 
policy tools, for building resilience in the face of uncer-
tainty. The challenges of underpinning projections of 
future climate change and its augmentation of extreme 
events, along with the development context in which 
these events will play out, requires new approaches to 
supporting resilience. Given what we now know about 
the multiple poverty impacts of disasters, the different 
scales across which these are felt and the fact that 
there is no simple co-location of these phenomena, 
efforts to pursue development and build resilience to 
climate extremes will need to switch their focus: 
• We will need to pay more attention to building ca-
pacities of communities and societies to anticipate, 
absorb and adapt to climate extremes, than on 
targeting solutions at particular places or types of 
extreme events that are expected in the future.  
• However, iteratively building capacity to anticipate, 
absorb and adapt to climate extremes may not be 
sufficient to secure poverty reduction in the face of 
climate change. 
• Planning and policy tools will also need to promote 
transformative changes to fundamentally and sustain-
ably improve resilience in ways that will often chal-
lenge existing socio-economic and political systems. 
• Solutions will need to link different institutions that 
have previously been poorly connected, such as 
social protection and early warning systems. 
• Solutions will also need to prioritise new criteria in 
decision-making, such as whether they are robust 
across different possible climate futures and whether 
they are flexible enough to be easily altered. 
• This will enable us to develop solutions that are not 
focussed on any one particular event, location, or 
group of people, but can be adapted across differ-
ent climate scenarios. 
• Evidence tells us this is feasible, but that the scale 
of ambition and action we have achieved to date 
must rise.
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may be less climate-sensitive (e.g. artisanal trades) 
so that even if one source of livelihood is disrupted, 
another continues.
Anticipatory capacity is the ability of a system to 
anticipate and reduce the impact of climate variability 
and extremes through reduced exposure and vulner-
ability to specific (known) hazards. Actions that are 
indicative of anticipatory capacity include a range of 
emergency preparedness activities, such as training 
exercises and simulations, contingency preparedness 
and response planning, and pre-positioning of goods 
and services.
Absorptive capacity is the ability to absorb and 
cope with the impacts of climate variability and 
extremes, through emergency management, to 
minimise damage and disruption. Having savings and 
safety nets in place can help buffer disaster impacts, 
allowing people to recover more quickly. Therefore, 
having access to micro-credit, weather-indexed 
insurance and social protection is often seen as a sign 
of absorptive capacity.
All three capacities are required, though it is only 
within a specific context that one can determine a) 
the weight of emphasis required between each and 
b) which need to be strengthened, depending on the 
needs and existing capacities of communities, as well 
as the types of risks faced. For example, the capacity 
of a country like Japan (see box 2) to anticipate and 
absorb hazards is not found in many other places and 
the cost of flood control programmes is beyond the 
Box 2. Flood risk management in Japan 
Investment in building resilience to cyclones and flooding 
has had marked results in Japan, in terms of both 
reducing mortality and damage to property. Japanese 
data provide some of the best demonstrations of what 
can be achieved in terms of building resilience to multiple 
shocks and stresses. Detailed and comprehensive data 
on disaster deaths, as well as houses damaged and 
destroyed, have been collected since 1945, when the 
country was administered by the US. 
A major national campaign of disaster risk reduction 
was instituted in 1961 after a catastrophic storm surge 
flood in Ise Bay inundated much of the city of Nagoya, 
leading to more than 5,000 deaths. The 1961 ‘Disaster 
Countermeasure Basic Act’ legislated a change from 
a reactive to proactive approach to disasters (National 
Land Agency Japan, 1961). Regional disaster prevention 
plans were established, including forecasting systems, 
flood defences, warning criteria, rescue systems and 
emergency communications. During the 1960s and 
1970s, many multi-purpose dams were built for both 
flood control and water supply, allied with programmes of 
river channel capacity expansion and increased retention 
capacity to mitigate increased run-off from urban devel-
opment. The government also funded the development of 
high-resolution flood hazard maps to inform development 
and land-use decisions.
The demonstration of progress in Japan is most 
convincing for typhoons. The average annual mortality 
rate reduced from 1.1 per 100,000 people in the 1950s 
to 0.08 per 100,000 people in the 1960s. Compared 
with the 1960s, the 1950s was a period of intense 
and damaging typhoon activity, so this reduction is not 
entirely linked to the implementation of Disaster Risk 
Management policies in 1961. However, the relatively 
low mortality rate persisted even when typhoon activity 
picked up again after 1990, highlighting that, in the 
longer-term, a significant part of this reduction was the 
product of active intervention: from protective infra-
structure through to better preparedness planning and 
evacuations. For non-typhoon related floods, there was a 
66% decrease in mortality from the 1950s to the 1960s, 
with a further 58% reduction between the 1960s and the 
1970s. There is no suggestion of any significant decadal 
variability in precipitation in Japan, so these reductions do 
appear to reflect principal improvements in flood defence 
and other DRM investments. 
The Japanese experience highlights the order of 
magnitude of potential reduction that can be achieved 
in a rapidly growing economy. Structural flood control 
measures have also led to a significant decrease in the 
number of houses inundated (which provides a proxy for 
normalised economic losses). Over the period 1950-1990, 
the population of Japan and the number of dwelling units 
increased by around 55%, so normalising the number of 
houses flooded according to population could only serve 
to amplify the reduction.
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means of most developing countries. However, what 
the Japan case does show, as iterated throughout this 
report, is that there is a need to combine approaches 
with improved capacity to adapt to multiple, long-term 
and future risks. This requires ‘softer’ measures, such 
as land-use planning that proactively accommodates 
conditions that have changed or are about to change. 
This, in turn, demands acknowledgement that the 
world is in flux, not only in terms of the climate 
extremes we will face, but also the development 
backdrop against which the impacts of those extremes 
will be most deeply felt. 
6.1.2 The need for transformation
Climate-related risks to development progress are 
growing rapidly due to rising levels of exposure, vul-
nerability and changing hazard burdens influenced by 
climate change. As a result, building the 3As resilience 
capacities incrementally may not be enough to secure 
poverty reduction in the face of climate extremes. For 
example, incremental changes to current DRM systems 
in countries like Mali are unlikely to be enough to 
ensure resilient poverty reduction over the next 15 to 
30 years. The scale and scope of future climate risks 
identified in Mali, India, the Philippines and beyond 
will require a transformational shift in the way risk is 
managed, using climate and weather information and 
scenarios to inform development planning decisions.
Through problem identification and 
the creation of broad-based support, 
actions can be taken with strong 
transformative potential
Attention is turning to the types of transformative 
changes that are needed in anticipatory, absorptive 
and adaptive capacity, and how signs of transformation 
can be detected and supported. A new narrative 
linking climate and development is needed, whereby 
transforming resilience capacities is seen as an 
opportunity and impetus for change and progress 
toward poverty reduction and economic growth. 
“Transformation refers to the likelihood of human 
systems to fundamentally and sustainably improve 
the resilience of vulnerable citizens to the impacts of 
climate extremes and change” (Bahadur et al., 2015). 
As such, this entails enhancing resilience in ways that 
will often challenge the existing socio-economic and 
political systems. 
Transformational changes tend to be catalytic, 
leveraging change beyond the initial direct activities; 
achieve change at scale in terms of outcomes 
achieved in relation to the magnitude of resource 
inputs; and are sustainable, insomuch as processes of 
resilience building are sustained once initial support 
ends (Bahadur et al., 2015).
Under these criteria, the reform of the Japanese 
flood risk management system would be classified as 
transformational, initiating a nation-wide process of 
risk assessment, infrastructure projects, early warning 
systems and preparedness planning that continues to 
be updated and improved on today. This exemplary 
case may be difficult to replicate because of the high 
cost, skills requirements and strength of private sector 
engagement. However, through problem identification 
and the creation of broad-based support (engaging 
actors domestically and internationally, including 
the private sector) actions can be taken with strong 
transformative potential. 
6.2 Planning and policies for building resilience in 
the face of uncertainty
The uncertainty created by a changing climate and 
dynamic development trajectories poses challenges for 
actors’ planning and decision-making, many of whom 
are already trailing new approaches. For example,there 
is already momentum in a shift toward more robust 
and adaptive approaches to planning and decision 
making from fields including climate change (Jones et 
al., 2014), food security (Vervoort, 2014) and develop-
ment (Doing Development Differently, 2014). Scenario 
planning, use of ‘serious games’ that allow people to 
explore potential futures and other innovative tech-
niques have been trialled with considerable success, 
but these pilots now need to be brought to scale and 
become new standards in planning practice. Solutions 
need to be designed with uncertainty in mind, starting 
not with predictions, but plans to reduce poverty in 
places and within groups already adversely affected by 
climate extremes and variability. We need to start with 
the plans and then identify the climate futures most 
relevant to their success (Lempert, 2015).
This section identifies where planners and 
policy makers can focus their efforts to improve 
resilience under uncertainty, drawing on lessons from 
experience.
6.2.1 Building capacities and strengthening systems
The case studies described in this report confirm there 
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are approaches to building resilience that are making 
a difference in many communities, but progress 
has been uneven. Evidence from past events reveal 
how the influence of climate extremes on patterns 
of poverty is shaped by capacity at the local and 
sub-national levels. This is shown clearly through the 
positive examples of decentralised DRM structures in 
the Philippines and the network involved in the Mali 
Météo agrometeorological initiative, where well-con-
nected local structures house significant capacity to 
strengthen anticipatory action in the face of forecast 
climate extremes. Initiatives such as these (and the 
use of Heat Action Plans in India) have worked well at 
the sub-national level but struggled to be scaled out 
comprehensively; in some cases, they have seen only 
partial implementation, due to piecemeal or poorly 
coordinated approaches.
These challenges point to the continued need 
for investment in sub-national and local capacities 
and institutions, and for efforts to strengthen whole 
systems, such as for drought forecasting and prepared-
ness in Mali (see box 3). Investments in climate services, 
for example, will need to be accompanied by systemic 
capacity development to be effective. 
In the Sahel, integrating market information in 
early warning systems at the national and regional 
levels provides a useful entry point for improving 
coordination of drought management across these 
scales (Brunelin, 2015). Meanwhile, the communi-
ty-based DRM approach in the Philippines, which 
is strongly rooted in principles of participation and 
public accountability, has produced a fundamental 
shift in preparedness and response planning. Building 
adaptive capacity and avoid increasing exposure to 
these ever more frequent events will, however, require 
deeper engagement with the private sector to develop 
a set of incentives to enhance compliance with the 
2013 regulation prohibiting construction within 40m of 
the coast.
In India, on the other hand, the Heat Action Plan 
in Ahmedabad and the State of Orissa represent 
comprehensive strategies for combatting extreme 
heat at corresponding levels, involving planners, the 
construction sector, hospitals, schools and other sectors 
and stakeholder groups. System-wide changes were 
brought about through concerted action across a range 
of disciplines and practice areas, including architectural 
design, training programmes and changes in the use of 
public facilities. The challenge now is to replicate these 
experiences so that other states and cities can be better 
prepared, without having to learn these lessons the hard 
way. This will require better integration of government 
Box 3. Contrasting decentralised drought preparedness in Mali and Kenya
Even when the need to invest in capacity at the sub-national 
level is acknowledged, decentralised systems often lack 
frontline resources. They are also frequently poorly con-
nected to other institutions and systems that may be vital 
to them efficiently responding to extreme climate events. 
Often organised sectorally, they can also lack a mandate for 
dealing with complex issues like drought management. 
Government in Mali, for example, has been 
decentralised since the late 1990s; communes have 
responsibilities in education, sanitation, waste and 
natural resource management, but are not involved in 
anticipating or responding to drought. This illustrates a 
structural deficit that renders these sectors unprotected 
from drought risk at precisely the administrative level 
where coordinated action to reduce climate-related risks 
could be most effective. These authorities could become 
important entities for resilience building and drought 
management, helping transmit climate information 
both upwards and downwards, and contributing to the 
targeting of vulnerable populations. 
Much as the National Drought Management Agency in 
Kenya houses regional agencies in all counties in the arid 
and semi-arid regions of the country, the Malian system 
could rely on a strong decentralised governance structure 
to extend its drought management and food crisis manage-
ment systems. If such a system was efficiently harnessed 
and supported with sufficient human and financial 
resources, it would help in the coordination of drought 
management across the different scales of governance. 
Another advantage to designating and funding a climate 
risk management mandate at the equivalent of the county 
(cercle) level in Mali would be that it would increase the 
efficiency of resilience building across impacted sectors 
and also link regions that are not equally exposed to 
drought events but are, as highlighted earlier, nevertheless 
economically vulnerable to the consequences.
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planning processes and more effective use of climate 
extreme scenarios, between district, state and national 
units of government.
Looking ahead, local institutions need to be empow-
ered with the resources and skills that enhance their 
flexibility and ability to identify a range of approaches 
to build anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive capacity. 
They must also be integrated with national and region-
al-scale systems that can inform and support them. 
Decentralisation processes currently being undertaken in 
a range of countries offer an opportunity to build better 
links.
6.2.2 Thinking globally; assessing risk locally
Poverty and climate extremes are often presented 
as global problems with local impacts. Analysis of 
the nature of the problem and how to address it will 
change depending on the scale of focus. While regional 
and global assessments are essential for understanding 
the scope of the challenge and cumulative impacts, 
evidence from the Philippines and Mali suggest 
local diagnosis is needed to provide a more accurate 
understanding of how risk and vulnerability are 
distributed. There are real limits to global analyses of 
risk and attempts to identify so-called vulnerability 
‘hotspots’ for action where poverty and projected 
climate extremes coincide (see box 1). Instead, a more 
coordinated linking of macro-to-micro-scale analyses 
is required, drawing on the comparative strengths 
offered at each level. 
Box 4. Adaptive social protection
One example of a measure designed with uncertainty 
in mind is adaptive social protection (ASP). At present, 
despite the known benefits of disaster risk reduction 
and preparedness, social protection programmes are 
rarely designed to address the risks and impacts of 
natural hazards in advance. In most cases, the use of 
social protection mechanisms to support people to deal 
with disasters and climate shocks has been ex-post and 
ad-hoc. However, ASP measures – while still fairly new – 
offer significant potential to support resilience in the light 
of increased uncertainty.
The concept of ‘adaptive social protection’ (ASP) rec-
ognises the importance of reducing vulnerability to shocks 
in the interest of sustainable development and therefore 
aims to promote integration between social protection, 
climate change adaptation and DRM. By integrating climate 
adaptation, social protection could better serve the needs 
of the poorest and most vulnerable members of society to 
deal with climate variability and extreme weather events. 
Meanwhile, DRM and climate change adaptation initiatives 
could benefit from social protection’s mechanisms for 
lifting the these groups out of poverty. The timeliness and 
scalability of social protection interventions are central to 
their effectiveness in responding to disasters and climate 
extremes, when assistance is needed quickly by large 
numbers of affected people. To improve these, a growing 
number of social protection programmes are using triggers 
such as weather-based indices as features of their design 
(Bastagli and Harman, 2015).
Innovative cases of adaptive social protection include 
those with rainfall insurance and temporary employment 
in community-based DRM projects.
• In Mexico, the Temporary Employment Programme, 
Programa de Empleo Temporal (PET), includes 
programmes that build environmental or 
sustainable agricultural improvements, targeted at 
community-based projects that reduce risks from 
climate-related shocks.
• Bangladesh’s Chars Livelihoods Programme combines 
public works that reduce flood risk with post-disaster 
support to restore assets in the case of a disaster. Its 
monitoring and evaluation systems measure climate 
resilience outcomes.
• Ethiopia is home to the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, 
which empowers rural households by offering 
integrated risk management services through 
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme and 
the marketplace. This includes parametric micro 
insurance, enabling subsistence farmers to receive 
payouts when rainfall is insufficient for their crops.
• The Tanzania Social Action Fund is a safety net pro-
gramme that combines conditional cash transfers with 
climate resilient community investments to help manage 
future extremes and accelerate beneficiary transition out 
of the social protection system (known as ‘graduation’).
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Lessons from research conducted by the Climate 
and Development Knowledge Network suggest that 
for risk assessments to be useful for development 
planning, they need to be undertaken as part of an 
overall appraisal process that considers the whole range 
of costs and benefits of different investments. This 
process also needs to engage local producers and users 
of risk information in the design and implementation of 
these assessments. Inter-governmental and multi-scale 
partnerships can help create high quality assessment 
tools at the local level, where capacities are lower or 
non-existent, and will help promote geographical 
replication across local administrative units. This has 
happened in Costa Rica through the standardisation of 
disaster data, where local actors provide information on 
disaster impacts while the national government (along 
with universities) develops and updates the protocols 
for including this information in a national database, 
as well as providing training on how the system works 
(Wilkinson and Brenes, 2014).
6.2.3 Linking institutions and solutions 
The climate extremes-poverty-disasters nexus presents 
challenges for coordination across different fields 
of policy and practice. Solutions that strengthen 
resilience and reduce poverty will need to link 
different institutions that have previously been poorly 
connected, such as social protection and early warning 
systems, or development and disaster insurance. 
Adaptive social protection programmes (see box 4) and 
the use of seasonal climate forecasts in disaster man-
agement planning (Braman et al., 2012) are promising 
Box 5: Innovative financing to safeguard against climate extremes
New and innovative financing models for anticipating, 
absorbing and adapting to climate extremes are being 
trialled across a range of scales and settings, with some 
offering potential both for scaling up and out. As an 
example, risk pooling mechanisms that promote ex-ante 
investments in DRM or adaption are not yet common, 
but could help address an existing and growing need to 
be better equipped to manage climate extremes. These 
kinds of funding arrangements tend to be used to pay for 
emergency response, assisting countries that would not 
otherwise be able to pay through their budgets. 
Since 2012, the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) has 
been assisting African Union member states to reduce 
disaster impacts by providing targeted disaster response. 
Satellite technology is used to estimate and trigger readily 
available funds to African countries hit by severe weather 
events. This, combined with a disaster risk pool, reduces 
the cost to countries of responding to emergencies 
and decreases reliance on external aid. Through the 
newly created Extreme Climate Facility (XCF), ARC could 
provide financial coverage for African governments on 
a longer time horizon. This would involve focussing on 
the prospective increased incidence of extreme weather 
events over the coming decades, rather than only on 
sudden onset events and inter-annual rainfall variation. 
The XCF will provide additional funds to countries that 
are already managing their weather risks with ARC and 
located in regions that experience a detectable increase 
in the frequency and severity of extreme events. This will 
allow countries to implement or scale-up their climate 
adaptation and/or DRM plans in the regions where such 
investments are most needed. 
As another example, Index-based disaster insurance 
programmes – pioneered in Ethiopia, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Vietnam, the Caribbean and Malawi – are now gaining 
popularity around the world as a way of building the 
resilience of poor farmers to climate extremes. Index-
based products have been able to overcome some of the 
limitations of traditional disaster insurance, by reducing 
the transaction cost and justifying entry of insurers 
and extension of their coverage to poor people. Along 
with this, the insured do not need to be active bank 
customers to be eligible, as they do with other types of 
insurance. Such systems can only function where there 
are monitoring systems in place to track the inception, 
growth and termination of weather hazards and this 
requires investment in the support infrastructure and 
technical capacities. One of the most useful options for 
poor farmers using rainfall index insurance is linking it 
to credit. In this way, a loan used to purchase inputs to 
increase productivity is protected from drought risk. With 
an unprotected loan if the required rains fail, a farmer 
would not only suffer crop failure, but would still be 
required to repay the loan. With an insured loan, however, 
the loan repayment would be covered should the crop fail, 
avoiding driving the farmer further into poverty.
Written by Emily Wilkinson
56 Climate extremes and resilient poverty reduction
as examples of coordinated planning and response 
between entities that have historically not been well 
linked.
Fundamental changes to policies and decision-mak-
ing processes are needed for many of these approaches 
to be taken up at a wide scale and in a sustained way, 
involving reconfigurations of institutional and power 
relations across scales of governance. The example of 
decentralisation of drought risk management in Kenya 
is a good example of this kind of reform (see box 3). 
6.2.4 Finance as a catalyst for transformation 
Risk financing is not a panacea for enhancing resilience 
capacities, particularly not in lower-income countries, 
but when designed effectively it could play a catalytic 
role. The delivery of climate finance continues to fall 
short of commitments, while the cost of disasters 
continues to escalate globally, with more needing to 
be done to identify investments that will help achieve 
resilient poverty reduction in the face of future extreme 
events. 
At the same time, there are innovations in financing 
models being developed or piloted in one field, such as 
enhanced direct principles being developed under the 
Green Climate Fund. These include those that devolve 
decision-making and resource management to national- 
level entities (Green Climate Fund, 2014) and new 
financing models for responding to climate extremes 
(see box 5) and can inform financing approaches 
elsewhere.
6.2.5 Defining poverty in dynamic terms
The findings of this report bring the need to better 
recognise the dynamic interplay between climate 
extremes and poverty to the fore; as a consequence, 
development actors must look at poverty reduction in 
new terms, in ways that explicitly deal with the uncer-
tainty of future climate conditions. Acknowledging the 
role of climate-related shocks in influencing people’s 
movements in and out of poverty forces us to think of 
being poor in less static terms. Poverty is a state from 
which some people move in and out, with climate and 
other shocks often affecting that movement (World 
Bank, 2015c). What becomes important from this 
perspective is people’s resilience to poverty, not just 
their poverty level at one time (Tanner and Mitchell, 
2008). Understanding how climate extremes and 
shocks force people in and out of poverty, particularly 
in cases of recurrent shocks, such as those seen in Mali, 
will be an essential aspect of strengthening resilience, 
especially where these extremes are projected to grow 
in frequency and severity. Targeted social protection 
programmes that aim to reach the poorest and most 
vulnerable can be adapted to take these dynamics into 
account so they reach those who might otherwise fall 
into poverty under a changing climate (see box 4). 
Resilient poverty reduction will therefore need to:
• undertake measures to target those close to the 
poverty line, not just those under it 
• strengthen the agency of local actors to plan and 
protect themselves from these shocks, through 
enhanced anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive 
capacity 
• transform the institutions that shape people’s 
access to knowledge and the resources needed to 
act in the face of increasing climate extremes and 
high levels of uncertainty. 
6.3 Conclusion 
A sea change is required in the way we act on poverty 
reduction, across scales. ‘Business as usual’ will not 
go far enough. Incremental changes to current 
systems can be a step in the right direction, but are 
not adequate for reaching either the depth or scale of 
change that will be required to achieve the coupled 
aims of poverty eradication and resilience to climate 
extremes. We must deal with the reality that structural 
and systemic barriers to resilience to poverty need to 
be lifted and that this can only be achieved in some 
contexts through transformational changes in policy 
architecture, institutions and financing arrangements. 
As the degree and scope of transformational change 
required is at once global and at every scale, it cannot 
be prescribed as a carbon copy to be replicated the 
world over. It can, however, be informed by new 
evidence generated through the analysis in this report. 
CHAPTER 7  
Ensuring resilient poverty 
reduction
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To meet our global SDG commitment to eliminating 
extreme poverty, we need to build resilience alongside 
ambitious global commitments to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and decarbonise development. Both 
are needed if we are to avoid even more catastrophic 
climate extremes in the long-term. Reaching and 
sustaining zero extreme poverty requires our collective 
effort to build resilience to the impacts of current 
climate extremes and projected climate changes.
This report provides new insights on the climate 
extremes-disasters-poverty nexus. This chapter dis-
cusses the main findings of the analysis and presents 
policy recommendations for addressing the intercon-
nected challenges of managing climate extremes, 
reducing disaster risk and eliminating extreme poverty.
7.1 Key findings from the report
7.1.1 Climate extremes are an increasing problem
Our climate has warmed in the past 50 years (IPCC, 
2014a) and patterns of extreme events have also 
shifted (IPCC, 2012). Global trends include a decrease 
in the number of cold days and nights, and an increase 
in the number of warm days and nights, but when we 
look more closely at the climate data, there are huge 
regional variations. Overall, we have seen extreme 
events, like those experienced recently in Mali, India 
and the Philippines, becoming more frequent.
Changes in climate extremes need to be studied at 
the local level, as what is considered ‘extreme’ occurs in 
relation to what is ‘normal’ in a specific context. In the 
West African Sahel, for example, there has been high 
variability in rainfall in recent years, with implications 
for both droughts and floods. In the Philippines, Super 
Typhoon Haiyan is considered to have been a ‘very 
extreme event’, breaking records as one of the strong-
est tropical storms to ever make landfall. Extreme heat, 
meanwhile, is one of the most easily identifiable effects 
of human-induced climate change and there has been 
a steady rise in the number of extreme hot days in 
most of the world since 1997 (Seneviratne et al., 2014).
To avoid surpassing a 2oC global mean temperature 
rise (above pre-industrial levels), we need to achieve 
zero net GHG emissions before 2100 (Granoff et al., 
2015), which means emissions peaking by 2030. Even 
if this is possible, we are likely to see more of the kinds 
of extremes highlighted in this report over the next 15 
years, including climate extremes of a higher frequency 
and intensity in some places, along with greater varia-
bility and uncertainty in many more. As climate change 
continues, especially if we exceed a 2oC global mean 
temperature increase, these changes in extremes will 
become increasingly difficult to manage in a growing 
number of places. The science explaining the relation-
ship between global warming and extreme events and, 
in turn, for modelling future changes in those extreme 
events, has been improving rapidly. Still, much remains 
unknown and while we can anticipate certain patterns 
of increasing risk, we will never be able to fully predict 
the occurrence of specific extreme events in all places. 
This is the challenge we face when managing future 
climate risk. 
7.1.2 Climate extremes have multiple poverty impacts 
across scales
This report focuses on the poverty impacts of climate 
extremes at the sub-national level.  The impact on 
poverty and the multiple effects disasters have on the 
poor themselves may collectively be more damaging 
to poverty reduction efforts than increasing average 
temperatures alone, at least over the next 30 years. 
In the literature and case studies presented here, we 
see climate extremes affecting poverty levels by push-
ing people below the poverty line – for example, in the 
Philippines, estimates suggest that 2.3 million people 
may have been pushed below the national poverty 
line as a result of Super Typhoon Haiyan (GFDRR, 2014). 
Poverty is dynamic and there is strong evidence to 
suggest millions move in and out of it every day. This 
is due to abrupt changes in levels of consumption 
brought about by different shocks and stresses, of 
which climate extremes are just one kind.
In all three case studies, climate extremes are 
seen to affect the poor because of their high levels 
of exposure and vulnerability. For all three types of 
events, we see a disproportionate impact on those who 
live below the poverty line and suffer from non-income 
dimensions of poverty, such as poor housing. We also 
see a range of types of impacts on the poor, including 
those felt directly by the household, those that are 
indirect and via development impacts, and effects that 
are short- and longer-term (see table 1, chapter 1). The 
immediate impacts on poor households described in 
this report include loss of life (and associated loss of 
household earnings), along with illness, loss of crops 
and other assets; meanwhile, longer-term effects 
include increases in the price of staple foods and a 
reduction in food security, along with malnourishment, 
malnutrition and stunting in children, as well as lower 
educational attainment.
In the Philippines, households dependent on fishing 
and farming activities suffered the most after Super 
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Typhoon Haiyan, with fisheries and coconut farmers 
particularly badly affected. Beyond the immediate 
aftermath of Haiyan, the increased cost of living in 
Tacloban put further pressure on poor households. 
Drought, on the other hand, generally leads people to 
sell off their assets, reduces levels of consumption and 
can result in malnutrition; the drought affecting the 
whole of the Western Sahel during 2011-2012 saw a 
reduction in food availability. Combined with conflict 
and instability in the north of Mali, this generated food 
insecurity for most of the population in that area and, 
over the longer-term, has led to stunting in children. 
In India, heat stress has caused illness and affected 
incomes and productivity when places of employment 
are closed temporarily or people are too unwell to 
work.
Indirect impacts of climate extremes are felt not 
only by poor households living in affected areas but 
also by those in other  parts of the country, through 
knock-on effects (see table 1, chapter 1). These are 
transmitted through a number of different mecha-
nisms, including drops in productivity and economic 
growth, along with loss of government assets, 
service disruption and the diversion of government 
spending to response activities. Nevertheless, income 
distribution and inequality are crucial to impacts. 
National development indicators do not always reflect 
the severe consequences of disaster for the poorest 
members of society and care needs to be taken in 
interpreting impacts at this level. For example, Super 
Typhoon Haiyan caused major service disruption, 
but does not appear to have had a negative effect on 
national growth rates, even though poor households in 
the area affected by Haiyan saw a 40% drop in income 
(GFDRR, 2014).
7.1.3 There is no simple co-location of climate 
extremes and poverty
This report demonstrates that the relationship between 
poverty and climate extremes is complex and there 
is no simple co-location of these two phenomena. 
Whether or not these phenomena interact spatially and 
create ‘hotspots’, around which to target interventions, 
depends on a number of factors. These include the 
type of climate extreme, location of the event and the 
type of impact (and hence how impact is transmitted). 
Drought can hit an agrarian area but have impacts 
elsewhere. It can even be spread throughout the whole 
economy, as we see in the case of Mali. Households 
are just as likely to be impacted in urban or densely 
populated areas, where demand is sensitive to food 
price fluctuations and cereal availability, as they are 
in places where high numbers of drought days have a 
direct impact on agricultural production. 
Tropical storms, on the other hand, have an impor-
tant localised impact on the poor, affecting those living 
in places directly damaged by high winds, storm surge 
and flooding. When these affect important economic 
centres like Manila, however, we would expect there to 
be an indirect impact on poor people living elsewhere 
in the Philippines, transmitted via the huge costs of 
recovery, economic slowdown and other system-wide 
effects.
7.1.4 Risk from climate extremes is increasing
This report highlights some parts of the world where 
patterns of extreme events are changing and risk is 
rising. Although climate science is improving and is 
better able to clarify climate change’s contribution to 
extreme events at the global scale, it is not always clear 
what local patterns of rainfall, temperature or hazards 
will look like over the next 15-25 years, let alone the 
second half of the century. Nonetheless, it is likely that 
more poor people will be exposed to the changes that 
do occur. People’s exposure is already changing as a 
result of wider trends, such as population growth and 
urbanisation. Problems are created by natural resource 
depletion, including deforestation and the destruction 
of mangroves on the coast, which provide natural 
protection against cyclones, storm surge and sea level 
rise.
In India, the risks of heatwaves are highest in urban 
areas because of the urban heat island effect and poor 
air quality. These combine to produce extreme urban 
heat, affecting the urban poor living in slums, homeless 
people, elderly people and those working outdoors. 
Those moving from rural to urban areas are particularly 
vulnerable to heat waves because they are generally 
poor and will most likely be moving to densely popu-
lated places with poor quality housing and restricted 
access to clean water and electricity. They will also be 
less connected to support networks and services than 
city dwellers.
Vulnerability is also increasing in places where 
shocks and stresses are recurrent, such as in the case 
of the Sahel. As noted in chapter 3, if households do 
not have the necessary time to fully recover from a 
drought, their vulnerability to subsequent shocks 
increases. 
Overall, climate science is improving in terms of 
clarifying climate change’s contributions at the global 
scale but, for several types of extremes and especially in 
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some of the most vulnerable regions, there are no clear 
projections about what to expect. Subsequent poverty 
impacts are often more complex and multidimensional 
than can be accurately predicted far into the future. 
However, we have seen that drought and poverty are 
intimately linked through direct and indirect impacts 
as well as feedback loops. It can also be observed 
that increasing uncertainty and variability in seasonal 
patterns poses its own set of problems for building 
resilience to drought. For other extreme events, there 
is greater certainty: heat stress related illness and 
subsequent productivity losses in India’s cities, along 
with widespread damage to low-income housing and 
productive assets in coastal areas of the Philippines, 
are set to increase if action is not taken to improve 
resilience.
7.2 Planning and policies for building resilience
This section identifies a set of messages for 
planners and policy makers that will help them to 
strengthen resilience and safeguard investments in 
poverty reduction.
7.2.1 Building adaptive, anticipatory and 
absorptive capacity
Tackling the combined challenges of poverty erad-
ication and climate change requires action to build 
resilience capacities. Capacity at the local level shapes 
how impacts of extremes play out and affect patterns 
of poverty. By building the anticipatory, absorptive and 
adaptive capacities of those communities and societies 
most vulnerable to increasing climate risks, we can 
minimise the impact of climate extremes on poverty 
levels and the poor.
7.2.2 Building institutional capacities and 
strengthening systems
Building local capacities and strengthening systems 
will remain a cornerstone of efforts to build resilience 
to climate extremes. Capacity at the local level shapes 
how impacts of extremes play out and affect patterns 
of poverty. Continued investment into local DRM 
capacities and institutions is required, as well as efforts 
to strengthen coordination across scales of govern-
ance. Decentralisation processes can help empower 
local institutions and, when coupled with efforts to 
integrate local units within national and regional 
planning systems, can produce more effective local 
solutions to the risks posed by climate extremes.
7.2.3 The need to think globally and assess risk locally
This report emphasises the need to think globally 
about the poverty implications of climate extremes, 
but assess risk locally. While regional and global 
assessments are essential for understanding the scope 
of the climate challenge, local diagnosis is needed to 
provide a more accurate understanding of how risk is 
distributed. Analysis that connects macro-to-micro-
scales, drawing on the comparative strengths offered 
at each level of analysis, will present a more nuanced 
and accurate picture of the climate change-disas-
ter-poverty nexus.  
7.2.4 Linking institutions and solutions 
Solutions that strengthen resilience and reduce 
poverty will need to link different institutions that 
have previously been poorly connected. Analysis of 
the relationship between climate change, disaster and 
poverty reveals some important gaps in connectivity 
and coordination across fields of policy and practice. 
More joined up ways of working across sectors and 
scales may be required, using climate and weather 
information and scenarios to inform planning.
7.2.5 The role of transformative action
Building adaptive, anticipatory and absorptive 
capacities incrementally may not be enough to secure 
resilient poverty reduction in the face of climate 
change. The scale and scope of future climate risks, as 
identified in Mali, India and the Philippines, requires 
a transformational shift in the way risk is managed. 
Transformational changes can be catalytic in nature, 
leveraging change beyond the initial direct activities. 
They achieve change at scale, with outcomes of a high 
order of magnitude relative to resource inputs, or they 
can be sustainable over time, outlasting initial political 
and/or financial support. 
7.2.6 Finance as a catalyst for transformation
Risk financing instruments have the potential to gen-
erate transformational changes by acting as a catalyst 
for further investment in disaster risk management and 
adaptation. Regional financing mechanisms can also 
help countries to scale up these investments in places 
where they are most needed. Finance is not a panacea 
and has limitations in some developing contexts, but 
it can and does offer opportunities for new ways to 
manage risk that warrant further attention as part of 
a portfolio of solutions.
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7.3 Achieving our global goals
The impoverishing impact of both climate change 
and disasters has been acknowledged internationally. 
In particular, the very first SDG is a commitment to 
end extreme poverty and includes a specific target to 
‘build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable 
situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability 
to climate-related extreme events and other economic, 
social and environmental shocks and disasters’ (United 
Nations, 2015a:15). This is in addition to a separate goal 
on action to combat climate change and its impacts, 
and the attention to resilience in the goal on safe and 
sustainable cities and settlements. These SDG targets 
reinforce commitments to action in complementary 
international agreements, such as the 2015 Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015) 
and outcomes of UNFCCC COP21.
The findings of this report are timely, coinciding 
with the early implementation of international 
frameworks that seek to build resilience capacities. 
These frameworks should serve as vehicles for 
promoting the kinds of transformative change that 
are needed at national and sub-national levels. The 
Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction and 
outcomes of the World Humanitarian Summit provide 
complementary opportunities to build anticipatory 
and absorptive capacities, while elements of the Sendai 
Framework also promote greater adaptive capacity, 
emphasising the need to mainstream risk manage-
ment into development approaches. An ambitious 
commitment to supporting adaptation efforts through 
the UNFCCC negotiations at COP21 would contribute 
significantly to these efforts.
Taken as a package, these 2015–2016 international 
frameworks provide different entry points for joining 
up efforts and addressing development challenges at 
the climate change-disaster-poverty nexus. 
For all of these goals to succeed, especially the 
elimination of extreme poverty, countries will need to 
ensure their development trajectories do not maintain 
or exacerbate climate risks. Instead, they will need to 
harness the breadth of financial, technical and policy 
mechanisms in place to build resilience in light of 
climate extremes and uncertainty. This requires analysis 
and action across scales, whereby national policies 
and investments are connected to local analysis and 
management of rising risks and uncertainties.
This is the challenge ahead.
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